Rupture and fusion in the approach to myth\(^1\)

Situating myth analysis between philosophy, poetics, and long-range historical reconstruction, with an application to the ancient and world-wide mythical complex of leopard-skin symbolism

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1. Introduction/ Abstract

On the basis of my engagement with myth over the decades, the present paper seeks to present some ‘prolegomena’ to the study of myth today. It does so, in the first place, by a short overview of philosophical contributions and implications of the study of myth. After formulating and discussing a possible definition of myth, the argument focuses on two complementary perspectives in the scholarly approach to myth: the objectifying perspective of rupture versus the participatory and identifying perspective of fusion. After indicating the pros and cons of both, and giving an example (notably, the ‘hero fights monster’ mytheme) of extensive continuity in myth through space and time, the paper concludes with a summary of the main results of the author’s current long-range com-

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Comparative research into leopard and leopard-skin symbolism, which is informed by loosely interlocking mythical complexes extending all across the Old World and part of the New World, over a time span from the Upper Palaeolithic to the present.

2. Philosophical approaches to myth

Myth is often taken for granted as a self-evident genre of symbolic production. As an Africanist empirical scientist I have often followed that approach. However, as an inter-cultural philosopher, it is my task to deconstruct self-evidences. Hence the present argument.

It is not as if philosophy offers a wide and generally agreed-upon perspective on myth, or as if myth has been one of philosophy’s central concerns in the last hundred years. Students of myth in the literary and social sciences including history will find that philosophers may occasionally take for granted such conceptual usages as have been adopted by the very fields of scholarship whose foundations philosophy is supposed to examine critically. This is largely the case for myth, as it is for philosophers’ none too innovative use of the concept of culture. At one level this may seem to be true even of a post-structuralist philosopher like Derrida. He does engage in debate with Lévi-Strauss on the interpretation of myth of the South American Bororo people, and with Plato on the interpretation of the myth of Thamos and Thoth as recounted in *Phaedrus*, and in so doing appears to take for granted conventional notions concerning the nature and confines of myth as a self-evident unit of analysis. However, at a more fundamental level Derrida’s deconstruction of the binary opposition (central to Lévi-Strauss’s approach to myth) through the notion of *différance*, and his critique of logocentricity, do offer some of the essential elements for a meaningful approach to myth today.

Myth has certainly featured in main-stream Western philosophy from its very inception, in the pre-Socratic Xenophanes’ (c. 570-480 BCE) attacks on his contemporaries’ mythical beliefs (without using the Ancient Greek word *muthos*), and somewhat earlier even in Theagenes of Rhegion’s allegorical interpretation of such stories featuring divine beings.

4 Derrida 1972.
5 Also cf. Derrida 1971; van Binsbergen 2005b.
The etymology of *myth* is charmingly uncertain. Most authoritative sources refuse to trace it beyond the Ancient Greek *muthos*. Partridge\(^7\) proposes an admittedly conjectural Indo-European root *mud-* or *mudh*, ‘to think, to imagine’, and sees cognates of the Greek form in Lithuanian, Old Slavonic and Old Irish; although he explicitly discusses Latin *muttūre* (‘muttering, mowing’) as part of a complex centring on the English *mute*, he does not suggest a link with Greek *muthos* on this point. Such a link is however claimed by van Veen and van der Sijs,\(^8\) who thereby exhaust their inventiveness, in the sense that they, too, refrain from tracing the etymology beyond Ancient Greek. Largely relying on and popularising Astour, Martin Bernal has placed controversial but often plausible proposals of Ancient Egyptian etymologies for Ancient Greek words at the heart of his *Black Athena* thesis.\(^9\) If *muthos* was not among Bernal’s original proposals, it might have been. For in Ancient Egyptian, *mdwj* \(\text{ Functor symbol } \) \(\text{ Coочкоо }\) means ‘speak, talk; word, saying’, and *mdwt* \(\text{ Functor symbol } \) \(\text{ Coочкоо }\) ‘speech, matter’.\(^10\) In general, the combination of both a semantic and a phonological fit is considered a strong indication for a valid etymological connection. But rather than concluding to specific Egyptian-Greek borrowing, we are reminded of a pattern where correspondences between Ancient Egyptian, Greek and Latin occur rather more frequently than could be predicted on the basis of the cladistic disparity of these languages: Egyptian being classified as belonging to the Afro-Asiatic family, the two latter languages as Indo-European.\(^11\) A possible explanation would be in terms of a postulated proto-Nostratic or pre-Nostratic substratum from which the various language families and languages could have emerged in the mid-Holocene – somewhat along the lines of Kammerzell’s argument on the intermediate position of Egyptian between Afro-Asiatic and Indo-European, of various claims as to the relative affinity between Egyptian and Hittite, and of my own emergent argument on the continuity of the Predynastic and Early Dynastic Delta with West Asia and South-eastern Europe.\(^12\)

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\(^7\) Partridge 1979, s.v. ‘myth’.

\(^8\) van Veen and van der Sijs 1997, s.v. ‘mythe’.


\(^10\) Gardiner 1994: 571; Hannig 2000: 1206. Because of the nature of Ancient Egyptian writing the vocalisation of its words is nearly always somewhat uncertain.


\(^12\) Kammerzell 1994; Ray 1992; van Binsbergen, forthcoming (b). Both the excessive antiquity and the wide spread of the root underlying *myth* are suggested by the fact that an apparently cognate form is also claimed for proto-Bantu, as \(^*\)-*béuyd-\((6.3)\), ‘speak, talk, say, tell, announce, ask (question)’ (Meeussen 1980). Kaiser & Shevoroshkin (1988) consider Niger-Congo (of which the Bantu languages constitute a major branch) as belonging to ‘Mega-Nostratic’, but this view is contentious.
The word *muthos* was common from Homeric times onwards, denoting ‘speech, spoken word, story, fable’, usually without implications as to the truth or falsehood attributed to its contents. What we classify today as myth, is told by Plato, e.g. the myth of the original duality and bisexuality of all human beings in *Symposium*, the myth of Er at the end of *Republic*, or most famous the myth of the cave in Book VII of the same work. Gradually the opposition was installed between *muthos* and *logos*; the former would increasingly denote the furtive, oral statement in specific situations, a statement which could be just hearsay and need not be true; while the latter would increasingly denote the compelling expression of law and order, immutable philosophical truth, divine rule, the divine creative act, and hence a transcendent form of truth which was increasingly denied to *muthos*. The emergence of philosophical rationality in classical Greece has often been described in terms of the transition from *mythos* to *logos*, a process in which Aristotle rather than his teacher Plato appears ultimately as ‘...’l maestro di color che sanno’ – ‘the master of those who know’, that is, of *those who have left myth behind them*. In the process, the critical approach to what we now call ‘Greek myths’ was further developed, e.g. in the work of Euhemerus (300 BCE), who saw all mythical divine characters as originating in deified historical human beings.

However, literary criticism, not philosophy, became the field where scholars pondered over myths, and the concept itself was not philosophically belaboured until the late 18th century CE, when Schelling developed a very subtle philosophical approach to mythology. He thus gave the decisive impetus to the development, as a major component of classical studies which were an emergent scientific discipline at the time, of a science of mythology, whose first major exponent was Karl Ottfried Müller. It needs no longer surprise us that the word ‘myth’ was only first attested in the English language as late as 1830, a quarter of a century later even than in Dutch (1804-1808).

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13 Liddell & Scott 1968, s.v. ‘µůθος’.
14 Plato 1921: *Symposium*, Aristophanes’ speech.
16 Cf. Metaphysics 1074b 1f, where Aristotle could be construed (cf. Dupré 1973-1974: 949) to use muthos more or less in our present-day sense, although it is more likely that he simple means ‘oral tradition’. Cf. Hegel 1992: 20, where the same idea is expressed: ‘Die Mythe gehört zur Pädagogie des Menschengeschlechtes.’
18 Little *et al.* 1978, s.v. ‘myth’.
19 van Veen and van der Sijs 1997, s.v. ‘mythe’.
20 Tylor 1948 (1871)
grabbed hold of the relatively orphaned concept of myth, and it is in the hands of these disciplines that a common, consensual scholarly understanding of myth has arisen between 1850 and 1950 – as the expression of a mythopoetic constructing of world and meaning that, while not impossible to understand, still was considered to be worlds apart from the scientific rationality which the pursuers of these disciplines attributed to themselves. From this relatively recent context, so replete with Faustian rationality and condescending objectification, arose the notion that we know what myths are and how we can identify them – that they are out there, to be drawn into the orbit of our scholarly analysis.

None has more emphasised than the neo-Kantian philosopher Cassirer (1874-1945) the extent to which the articulation of a mode of knowing beyond mythical thought was absolutely constitutive of the Enlightenment.21 And it is mainly to Cassirer that we owe, in modern philosophy, an extensive body of reasoning on the nature of myth, on mythical thought as a phase in the intellectual development of humankind, and on the use of myth in the construction of viable, even dangerous, socio-political communities. For Cassirer, the only way to appreciate mythical thought is by contrasting it with scientific thought. This operation is claimed to highlight22 what Cassirer considers to be the two principal characteristics of mythical thought:

a. unity of being between subject and world, as well as
b. the immediacy of experience.

Here Cassirer shows himself a true heir of the Enlightenment. No less rationalistic than that great twentieth-century CE anthropologist of myth Lévi-Strauss, Cassirer sees in myth a way of thinking, of conceptualising, the world, rather than a mode of religious existential signification.23 However, Lévi-Strauss shows the anthropologist’s fascination for the beauty of such mythical thought, for which he seeks to formulate a systematic poetics (in terms of deep structure and transformation, among other concepts) thus rendering systematic comparison and identification possible. Cassirer, by contrast to Lévi-Strauss, remains even truer to the tenets of the Enlightenment, in that Cassirer considers mythical thought an essentially erroneous mode of thinking about the world. Whatever the merits and limitations of Cassirer’s approach to myth, throughout the twentieth century CE philosophy has been mainly fascinated by other themes than myth, and has


22 In ways reminiscent of his contemporary Lévy-Bruhl, but, in Cassirer’s case, methodically worked out by reference to Kantian a-priori categories.

approached these from other perspectives than Neo-Kantianism, and as a result Cassirer’s impressive edifice remains largely isolated. Some of it was circulated in the social sciences, in a somewhat attenuated and bowdlerised form, by Cassirer’s admirers Suzanne Langer, Karl Mannheim, and C.W. Hendel. Few philosophical handbooks carry even an entry on ‘myth’. Rather than reflecting on the processes of identity formation, and on the construction of world and meaningfulness through verbal articulation, that lie implied in the concept of myth, many philosophers content themselves with using the word ‘myth’, without further problematisation, in the loose, modernist i.e. disenchanted, and one-sidedly pejorative, sense of ‘a collective representation\(^{24}\) that is patently untrue and that serves specific functions of justification and rationalisation for those who bring it in circulation and/or adhere to it’.

Cassirer wrote at a time when, inside Academia at least, scientific rationality went through an unbroken series of triumphs, when the cultural and somatic Other was largely absent from practical experience and nicely tucked away in distant colonies, and when the modernist heritage of the Enlightenment appeared to be humankind’s main defence against such frightening forms of mythical irrationality as nationalism, state communism and national socialism as marked the first half of the twentieth century.

He died a few months after Horkheimer and Adorno, in their American exile, published their \textit{Dialektik der Aufklärung}\(^{25}\) where the taken-for-granted juxtaposition between myth and Enlightenment is reconsidered: ‘...schon der \textit{Mythos} ist Aufklärung, und: die Aufklärung schlägt in Mythologie zurück’.\(^{26}\) In Horkheimer and Adorno’s book, the (mythical!) image of the Homeric hero Odysseus tied to the mast of his ship while his comrades submit to the luring chant of the Sirens, for scores of pages conjures up the tragic interpenetration of rationality and mythical thought which produced nazism and fascism.

Cassirer did not quite engage in such dialectics. His attempt to deal, once for all, with mythical thought is impressive, but fails to convince in our post-modern, re-enchanted, globalised world of today, where the proliferation of identities has been raised to one of humankind’s major industries, and where myths (from Christian, Islamic and Hindu religious fundamentalism, to New Age, to human rights and democracy as a justification for state violence, to the neo-liberal idea of the market) remind us every day that they, as myths, are here to stay. At the same time Cassirer reminds us, especially in his last book \textit{The myth of the state}, of the all-important political dimension of myths and their study: if

\(^{24}\) My choice of words is deliberate: such myths are considered to be the stuff out of which, in a way theorised by Durkheim (1912), society brings its members to venerate itself under the guise of the sacred.

\(^{25}\) Horkheimer & Adorno 1944; cf. Freyberg n.d.

\(^{26}\) Horkheimer & Adorno 1944: 14.
myth creates a collective life world (and by implication often render its built-in structural and physical violence invisible to the participants in that life world, the believers of myth), then the workings of myth are inevitably opposed to the assertion of individual knowledge, freedom, responsibility, and criticism: the ideals of the Enlightenment but also the foundations of modern human rights. Pitch sticks, and it is hardly surprising that some of the major students of myth in the course of the twentieth century, such as Jung, Eliade, de Vries, and Dumézil, had strong conservative tendencies often accused of bordering on fascism. To this political dimension we will return when, below, we discuss the role of the intellectual in the approach to myth, torn between, on the one hand,

- fusion with myth for the sake of individual sanity, the experience of beauty and a sense of social belonging; and, on the other hand,
- deconstructive critique of myth for the sake of society’s sanity and transparency, and the rational pursuit of valid scientific knowledge.

Leaning on Cassirer, but rather more promising and inspiring, is the approach of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dupré, who (unfortunately without the benefit of such inspiration as post-structuralist philosophy – Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari – might have brought to his argument) goes back to Schelling’s subtle understanding of myth as forming, and relating to, a whole, and therefore as far from allegorical. Dupré tries to make (at least, that is how I read him) the most of myth’s nature as context-informed, lived verbal expression in the here and the now, as against the ambitious, intimidating, transcendent, aspirations of logos. Reflecting the work of Eliade which was largely conceived before the work of such theoreticians of orality as Ong, Finnegan, Derrida, Goody, Havelock, etc., Dupré reminds us that the tension between mythos and logos is congruent with that between oral literature and writing. He stresses the kaleidoscopic nature of myth and of the world it creates. Myth revolves on a verbality which creates meaning and truth through articulation, and which appears to reside (especially in situations where writing is absent) in what (at least in my reading of Dupré) is implied to be an interlocking or alternation of immanence and transcendence, rather than external, transcendent procedures of verification and legitimation. The narrative then appears as

28 Dupré 1973; this makes one curious after his 1975 book, non vidi.
29 Cf. Witzel 2001, who stresses that myths should be compared not in their constituent parts, but as wholes.
30 Eliade 1963: 192f.
the core, not only of myth, but of the human existence *tout court*. This leads Dupré to distinguish four complementary tasks in our approach to myth:

1. to understand myth and mythology [not so much as antithetic to ratio, but rather] as the matrix within which the play of ratio (*Verstand*) and symbol takes place – and it is out of this play that culture is constituted
2. to realise that inevitably there are not only many mythologies but (within each mythology) pluralities of myth, whose interrelations we have to investigate, for it is these interrelations that constitute the community in tension with the individual person
3. to identify the liminal situation where the *logos* of speech determines the *mythos* to such an extent that it begins to coincide with the latter as self-reflecting theorising – in other words, as *philosophy*
4. on the one hand theory has to illuminate the mythical, but on the other hand it has the task of verifying the mythical element within the horizon of humankind, it has to become a self-reflective theory of the development of the mythical, i.e. a philosophy of history.

Little wonder that Dupré’s final conclusion is that ‘das Problem des *Mythos* ist letztlich das der Fundamentalphilosophie.’ Situating myth in the ubiquitous phenomenon of human verbal enunciation, of narration, implies that for Dupré myth is in itself a ubiquitous and self-evident aspect of the human condition, rather than a special form of thought reserved for narrowly circumscribed circumstances.

Dupré’s emphasis on the narrative element, which would make myth appear as primarily a form of orature, has a peculiar implication for mainstream myth analysis. Since so much of the latter deals, not with living myth orally presented in informal situations, but with established written texts and with pictorial and other artistic references to such written texts, it would seem as if in the academic practice the concept of myth has hardened, even fossilised, to the point where mythshave come to appear as a distinct and self-evident genre of texts readily available for processing in the hands of scholars. The rediscovery of orature in the last quarter of the twentieth century CE has done much to remedy this one-sidedness.

Dupré’s position is reminiscent of Barthes’s, whose *Mythologies* trace the structuring orientations behind late capitalist bourgeois life (so that for Barthes ‘myth’ comes

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31 Dupré 1973: 951.
32 Dupré 1973: 955f.
33 As does McDowell 2002.
34 Barthes 1957.
close to the Marxian ‘false consciousness’ – the mythical orientations in question are held to be mistaken conceptions of reality).

A similarly central place is attributed to myth by Kolakowski, who defines as myth any mental construct that imposes meaning, order, direction upon the human world. People construct myth in order to acquiesce themselves: in order to experience the empirical world as meaningful, in order to satisfy their desire for immutable values capable of underpinning their orientation in the world, and in order to escape from the temporal finiteness of their personal existence and of that of the world. In crucial contradistinction to Dupré (for whose approach to myth I highlighted the oscillation between transcendence and immanence), Kolakowski insists that any true myth represents a transcendent value, in which abstraction is made from the finiteness of human experience.

Kolakowski does not, in this connection, investigate the specific historical and socio-political conditions under which such transcendence may be attained as a technical accomplishment of thought. He implies it to be a universal and perennial human capability, per definition as universal as he claims myth itself to be. In one way he is right: such transcendence is already given with the word, on the principle posited by the great Dutch linguist Reichling that ‘language is a vicarious act’. But such a view of mythical transcendence is not very useful, because it would no longer allow us to distinguish between language in general, and myth as a very special form of language. I would rather suggest that, given the transcendent capabilities of the word (by which the here and now, by the mere act of speech, can be subsumed under words (any words) that have per definition (…!) a much wider application than just the here and the now), myth uses this capacity to the full and, as it were, raises it to the power 2, by conjuring up a world that

- is not only not here and not now but that may have no empirical existence whatsoever anywhere at any moment in time (which brings myth into the realm of the hearsay, the imagination, and the poetic),
- that is brought to life and to credibility by using of narrative modes analogous to (although not always identical with) the conventional methods of narration by which reliable, true reports on the empirical world outside the here and now are rendered; and finally a world that
- is not idiosyncratic, not exclusive to the narrating individual, but one whose narrative accounts are shared, circulated and reproduced within a wider community (which thus constitutes and perpetuates itself).

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37 Kolakowski 1984: 41.
38 Reichling 1967.
Thus myth creates an effective world that may or may not be real but whose main characteristic is that it appears as real to those who produce the tales on that world and to those who listen to it. Producing this appearance of reality involves an active process of captivating and persuading the listener with specific literary means. Principal among these means is analogy with the real life world of the here and now, even though this analogy may involve specific inversions, distortions, transformations. For the narrators and the listeners, therefore, the mythical world is scarcely distinguishable from, and scarcely discontinuous vis-à-vis, the empirical world.

It would be misleading to speak of transcendence, in this connection, as if it were a universal and self-evident condition. Only under certain conditions could the mythical world be said to be transcendent, in the sense of being strictly distinguished from the empirical world, at a totally different plane, absolutely incomparable to the empirical world and its inhabitants, and representing a totally different order. I submit that, in a pure form, such transcendence can only occur (i.e. can only be thought) in situations where people experience external forms of the exercise of authority and control, which are completely discontinuous with the ordinary and familiar forms of exercise and control informing their everyday life world here and now. Such external forms of authority and control are brought about mainly by writing, the state, an organised priesthood, and science – four devices that, separately or in combination, make it possible for an absent, dead, or even completely imaginary person (such as a testator, a king, the state, or a god) to exercise near to complete control over a situation here and now through the vicarious means of language. For all we know, writing, the state, an organised priesthood, and science only emerged in a very circumscribed spatial and temporal context: the Ancient Near East (including Egypt) by the end of the 4th millennium BCE. Only under such conditions would I expect myths to emerge that evoke a transcendent world absolutely incomparable to the ordinary life world – so absolutely that, for instance, a prohibition on graven images (like in Ancient Israel and Islam) may be entertained; yet even there the transcendent God is supposed to have created Man after his own image, as if even in a thoroughly literate and priestly context myth shies away from total transcendence. I consider the emergence of transcendence as a mode of thought the outcome of a long historical process, not as an immediate and inevitable implication of writing, the state, an organised priesthood, and science. The latter achievements did exist in 3rd millennium BCE Mesopotamia, yet one of the greatest specialists could still describe the mythico-religious orientation of that place and time as overwhelmingly immanentalist.39 Meanwhile we should realise that the four conditions listed here do not always occur in combi-

nation. State formation has been a widespread phenomenon on the African continent from the late 4th millennium onwards, yet in many cases these were states without writing. That even so statehood would amount to discontinuity with the cultural orientation of the here and now of local communities, and hence might constitute a growth point for transcendent thought, is suggested by my study of the Nkoya state in terms of such cultural discontinuity.40

These are some of the ideas that, in the background, will inform the argument which follows now.

### 3. A provisional definition of myth

There is no dearth of definitions of myth. Above we have already considered elements towards such a definition. Dupré gives a succinct one: ‘Mythos im weitesten Sinn verstanden beteует Wort, Rede, Erzählung von göttlichem Geschehen. Er begründet eine Tradition.’41 Famous is Eliade’s definition, whose extensive work on myth surprisingly continues to impress for its profound insights, in my opinion, now that I am re-reading it after more than thirty years:

‘le mythe raconte une histoire sacrée; il relate un événement qui a eu lieu dans le temps primordial, le temps fabuleux des “commencements”. Autrement dit, le mythe raconte comment, grâce aux exploits des Étres Surnaturels, une réalité totale, le Cosmos, ou seulement un fragment: une île, une espèce végétale, un comportement humain, une institution. C’est donc toujours le récit d’une “création”: on rapporte comment quelque chose a été produit [sic], a commencé à être. Le mythe ne parle que de ce qui est arrivé réellement, de ce qui s’est pleinement manifesté. Les personnages des mythes sont des Étres Surnaturels. Ils sont connus surtout par ce qu’ils ont fait dans le temps prestigieux des “commencements”. Les mythes révèlent donc leur activité créatrice et dévoilent la sacralité (ou simplement la “surnaturalité”) de leurs œuvres. En somme, les mythes décrivent les diverses, et parfois dramatiques, irruptions du sacré (ou du “sur-naturel”) dans le Monde. C’est cette irruption du sacré qui fonde réellement le Monde et qui le fait tel qu’il est aujourd’hui. Plus encore: c’est à la suite des interventions des Étres Surnaturels que l’homme est ce qu’il est aujourd’hui, un être mortel, sexué et culturel.’42

40 van Binsbergen 2003b.
41 Dupré 1973: 950.
42 Eliade 1963: 15.
While splendidly evocative and bringing out many points that are essential about definition humankind’s most cherished myths (but not all myths are myth of origin or of aetiology), this famous definition has a number of unmistakable shortcomings. Instead of a definition aiming merely at identifying elements of empirical reality open to further analytical scrutiny, it amounts to a theory in a nutshell, in that it already postulates specific relations between the various features of myth that the definition allows us to identify, and, in so doing, imputes such generality, even universality, into these features and their specific relations as could never be ascertained by a mere application of the definition in itself, but as could only be established on the basis of subsequent, painstaking empirical research. Moreover, the definition narrows down the occurrence of myths to such times and to such human communities as have a well-defined and interculturally recognisable notion of the sacred, of primordial time, of origins, of supernatural beings (so, by implication, cultures that explicitly make the distinction between nature and the supernatural), of creation, of the world. And it imputes to all contexts where myths are found, the notion (a notion, moreover, to be explicitly identifiable in the consciousness of the human actors native to such contexts) that the world and humanity, not only of the past but also of today, is constituted by the events recounted in the myths. For Eliade’s definition not only points out that the life world of the owners of a particular myth is (as could be argued from an analytical distance, by a scholarly outsider) constituted by that myth and other myths – but also that the myth owners themselves are conscious of the fact that this is how their world is constituted. We can easily grant all or most of these requirements when referring to the creation myths of the Ancient Near East, such as Enuma Elish (the Babylonian creation myth), or the creation stories of Genesis – products of a literate, state-based society with organised religion including a specialised priesthood defining, canonising, keeping, transmitting and publicly representing these myths as major components of the specialised professional science. But these specific socio-political features, however typical of the Ancient Near East, have only a very limited distribution throughout human history and across the continents. Most of these features, and many of the other specific stipulations of Eliade’s definition, would be absent in the African situations I have studied at close range for decades, for instance among the Nkoya people of western Central Zambia. Let us see if their situation can help us formulate a myth definition that is less theoretically presumptuous, and that therefore might have wider applicability than just literate, state-based societies with an organised priesthood.

A relative paucity of myths (by some conventional definition) as compared with other continents has often been claimed for Africa. Like other parts of Africa that (albeit for little more than half a century) happened to be colonised by the British (1900-1964) and explored by predominantly British scholarship, the Nkoya people of Zambia have

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43 Pritchard 1969.
been understudied as far as their myths, legends, folktales and other forms of oral literature is concerned.

Especially in regard of parts of Africa once colonised by the British, much work has been done on the possibility (or, considering myths’ dependence on latter-day political processes, the impossibility) of extracting, from African myths, objective historical information, especially concerning processes of state formation. After the enthusiasm for this approach in the 1970s and 1980s, we are now gradually realising that much of this work, including some of my own (1992), was based on the – less and less convincing – assumption that myths documented in Africa in the 19th and 20th century encoded actual historical processes of only a few centuries’ time depth, and could be thus decoded. In fact, it is now dawning upon us that this mythical material is often millennia old and that it is usually impossible to sort out how much of this ancient and entirely mythical contents has been projected onto relatively recent actual historical events. This line of argument has been advanced by Wrigley (1988), whose argument may be summarised as follows:

‘The work of M. Schoffeleers on Mbona, presiding spirit of a famous rainshrine in southern Malawi, is exploited in order to cast doubt on his reconstruction of 16th and 17th-century political history. It is suggested that Mbona was the serpentine power immanent in the Zambesi; that reports of his “martyrdom” at the hands of a secular ruler are versions of an ancient myth of the lightning and the rainbow; that his journey to, and subsequent flight from, Kaphiri-ntiwa, scene of the Maravi creation myth, is a variant of the visit made to the sky by Kintu, the “First Man” of Ganda tradition. It is not very likely that such stories attest the rise of a great military State c. 1600 and the ensuing suppression of religious institutions.’ (African Studies Centre, n.d.)

Mutatis mutandis, the same criticism could be levelled against my own work on the ethnohistory of the Nkoya people of Zambia, especially my Tears of Rain (1992). This research (conducted in close association with what was once the Manchester School of Gluckman and his associates) did touch on myth and oral traditions, but the main foci of my research in that connection have been ethnicity, kingship, and cults of affliction, against the background of social organisation at the village and urban-ward level. I never sought a comprehensive account of myth and other forms of orature in late twentieth-century CE Nkoya society. Nor was the way in which elements of myth circulated in everyday life and rituals, conducive to such an endeavour: in nearly three decades of intensive association with the Nkoya people through nearly annual spells of fieldwork,


45 As I began to realise by the end of the 1990s (van Binsbergen 1998; Vansina 1993 however seems inclined to accept my 1992 argument as to the historicity of these mythical traditions.
hardly any myths were ever formally recounted in full in my presence (and, as I am reasonably sure, neither in the presence of born Nkoya people). Instead, scraps of disconnected mythical elements were hinted at in songs, rumours, fireside stories and informal conversation, often disguised as allegedly historical events occurring in the lives of people still alive, of within, or at the border of, living memory. At first I fell into the trap of this historical illusion, producing my book *Tears of Rain* (1992) as a reconstruction of the last few centuries of precolonial Nkoya history based on these mythical elements. It was only in subsequent years, when reworking on this material comparatively (across Africa and even intercontinentally) that I awoke to their truly mythical nature. It was only then that I began to realise that what I (along with my interlocutors) had taken to be oral history of the 17th-19th centuries CE, was in fact a recasting of millennia-old mythical material, small parts of which could be retraced to Ancient Egypt, the Ancient Near East, and Ancient South and South East Asia, and in its specific local Nkoya application probably devoid of all objective historicity.

A very central myth among this people details the origin of kingship (Nkoya: *wene*), which the Nkoya consider one of their most central institutions, at a par with female puberty rites, funerary rites, and courts of law. The foundation myth of kingship is known to a great many people and enshrined in the oral-historical collection *Likota lya Bankoya* which their first Christian pastor, Rev. Shimunika, compiled in the middle of the 20th century. Since the myth and its background have been published elsewhere we may immediately proceed to the definition of myth which a consideration of this one case inspires.

Let us then define myth, provisionally, as:

- a narrative
- that is standardised
- that is collectively owned and managed
- that is considered by its owners to be of great and enduring significance
- that (whether or not these owners are consciously aware of this point) contains and brings out such images of the world (a cosmology), of past and present society (a history and sociology) and of the human conditions (an anthropology) as are eminently constitutive of the life world in which that narrative circulates, or at least: circulated originally
- to this we may add that, if this constitutive aspect is consciously realised by the owners, the narrative may be invoked aetio logically, to explain and justify present-day conditions

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• and that therefore is a powerful device to create collectively underpinned meaning and collectively recognised truth (regardless of whether such truth would be recognised outside the community whose myth it is).

4. Discussion of the definition

This definition helps to bring out some of the contradictions we have to consider in the study of myth.

I have avoided, in this definition, to introduce an element which many students of myth have considered important: the distinction between gods (who are supposed to be paraded in myth, constituting its distinctive feature) and heroes and ordinary mortals (who are supposed to feature in epics, which are held to be different from myths. My reason is that such a distinction between gods and mortals is predicated on the concept of transcendence, which we take for granted in late modern times and in the Western intellectual tradition but which yet, as I have argued, only emerges in its true form under very specific conditions of relatively limited distribution: writing, the state, priesthood, and science. I submit that typical of mythical narratives is not, statically, the evocation of gods, but the tension between two kinds of ontological conditions:

a) one godlike and moral, and the other
b) human/only-too-human (Nietzsche),

in such a way that the image of the world oscillates between occasional but unsystematic transcendence and a more standard condition of immanence.

The definition mixes emic elements (i.e. elements that are consciously recognised by the owners of the myth themselves in their very own concepts and language), with etic elements (that can only be formulated in the meta-perspective of scholarship and that tell us what a myth does provided the owners do not realise that this is what it is doing: constituting a life world, actively creating meaning and truth as if these were not self-evident and universal givens). According to a widespread view in philosophy and the social sciences today, human life worlds are not given but culturally created within narrow horizons of space and time, and meaning and truth – when considered from the scholar’s meta-perspective – are therefore far more contingent and relative than they would appear to be from the perspective of the local horizon constituted, precisely, by myth.

This is the standard view, based on a presentist perspective of mainstream sociology and anthropology, in which all culture is axiomatically considered to be individually acquired through a social learning process, life worlds are recognised be recent and,
under the onslaught of cultural globalisation supported by new technologies of communication and information, ephemeral. Under such conditions it is often possible to trace the relatively recent origin of specific myths, e.g. the foundation myths of world religions. ‘Relative’ is here taken against the time scale of the 200,000 years of the existence of Anatomically Modern Humans. However, there is evidence suggesting that in this longer time scale, these axioms may need to be reconsidered. The converging evidence from human cultural (near-) universals and from mythological archaeology reconstructing the oldest myths of Anatomically Modern Humans, bring out a picture of such immutable cultural inertia of key myths and key cosmologies that we must seriously consider the possibility that some mythica contents may be species-specific, and inherited through biological rather than social means. This, of course, is reminiscent of Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious, with this proviso that for Jung that collectivity did not necessarily encompass the whole of (Anatomically Modern) humankind, but could also be situated at the more restricted levels of major clades (‘races’, ‘gene pools’), nations, clans, and families.

The paradox which now opens up is that at the emic level myths may appear as universal and cross-culturally recognisable statements on the human condition, while at the etic level myths appear primarily as the kind of illusions that allow others, against all odds and against our better judgement, to create and maintain a human society. Analytically, from the etic perspective, myths are in the first place other people’s myths, and the task of scholarship in the field of myth is to describe and compare mythical contents and develop a meta-perspective in the light of which a more fundamental scientific truth may become detectable behind the particularistic myths that inform specific, narrow horizons of time and space. Ever since Xenophanes and Theagenes, and especially since Euhemerus, narratives have (through a process of labelling) become transformed into myth under the estranging gaze of the analytical scholarly outsider, for whom the myth does not contain truth, at least not the truth the owner and narrator consciously recognise. Hence, the construction of a specialist field of scholarship of myth risks to imply, in principle, an implicitly violent hierarchical re-ordering of the world on the basis of a radical distinction between

1. the collective owners/narrators of a myth, and
2. the scholarly analyst of the myth.

Here the analyst claims a privileged position which, if adopted by owners/narrators of myth, would destroy the latter’s position as well as the very myth itself. In recent decades, more than two millennia after the Ancient Greek debunkers of their contemporaries’ myths, such hierarchical analytical constructions often coincide with the juxtaposition between
• ‘the West’ (where most analysts of myth reside in fact, or – if residing elsewhere – which they have taken as a reference group)
• and ‘the Rest’.

Hence the deconstruction of myth (especially of such myth as underpins other cultures than the Western one) has been argued\textsuperscript{47} to belong to the overall installation of North Atlantic hegemonic violence, by materially and physically coercive means as well as by the claim of a monopoly on scientific rationality – without which there would be no science of myth as distinct from the narration and living of myths. The emic/etic distinction and the superiority claim involved in the etic deconstruction of myth, is typically modernist, and as such obsolescent in a postmodern world. In our largely postmodern world, mythical analysts’ claim of a privileged position (just like any such claim in the analysis of social and political life, the arts, religion etc.) has become profoundly problematic.\textsuperscript{48} Such a claim would appear to amount to a myth in its own right.

5. Rupture and fusion

But meanwhile the modernist pretence of having access to such a privileged position has brought us, as scholars interested in the study of myth, a wide but converging variety of insights into the literary, historical, psychological, cultural and socio-political manifestations and workings of myth. These insights carry their own fascination and justification. Perhaps more than anything else they respond to the Kantian admonition \textit{sapere aude} (‘have the courage to shed your ignorant naivety’), of which the Neo-Kantian Cassirer has been the most vigorous representative in the twentieth century. We would therefore be reluctant to sacrifice these insights on the altars of post-modernity and of, usually ephemeral, political correctness (such as is embodied in the emphasis on the hegemonic implications of an analytical perspective on myth that claims greater insight than the myth owners themselves can have. The scholarship of myth, in the broadest possible sense, is at the core of the construction of modernity from the Enlightenment onwards. The hallmark of modernity is the self-proclaimed capability of exploding other people’s myths, and of replacing them by more valid truths characterised by scientific rationality,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{47} Clearly somewhat myopically, considering the very recent installation of North Atlantic global domination (18th century CE or later), and the very great antiquity of Greek criticism of Greek myths (from 6th century BCE onwards).
\textsuperscript{48} For a Foucaultian critique of this illusion, based on the concept of genealogy (which is ultimately Nietzschean), see: Rabinow 1984; Foucault 1977.
\end{flushright}
objectivity and universality. Here the scholar’s principal approach to myth is that of 

rupture: the double movement by which the analyst of the myth

a. dissociates from the owners of the myth, and 
b. by which the myth (analytically diagnosed to contain a particular meta-message about history, cosmology, psychology etc. of which the owners are necessarily unaware) is torn apart from the life world in which it was originally cherished; is subsequently transformed; and is finally reproduced in the (meta-)terms of a different (typically North Atlantic or global) life world.

This analytical, reductionist assault on myth has been very much the dominant trend throughout the social-scientific study of myths since the late nineteenth century. It has produced a number of seminal approaches, such as:

- Bachofen’s and Graves’s meta-narratives explaining away important mythical material in terms of a lost world of gender equality and even female domination over men;
- Max Müller’s meta-narratives explaining away important mythical material in terms of recurrent astronomical processes involving the great luminaries sun and moon, and other observational regularities of the night sky;
- Frazer’s meta-narratives explaining away important mythical material in terms of kingship, magic and primitive science;
- Harrison’s meta-narrative explaining away important mythical material in terms of the universal precedence of myth over ritual, or ritual over myth
- Freud’s and Jung’s meta-narratives explaining away important mythical material in terms of universal human drives, dilemmas, contradictions and collective images;
- Lévi-Strauss’s meta-narratives explaining away important mythical material in terms of (essentially content-less) binary oppositions and transformations as constitutive of any human thought and of society in general;

49 Cf. Harding 1997 and my extensive, largely positive, reaction: van Binsbergen 2002c.
51 Müller 1873, 1880.
52 Frazer 1890-1915, 1918, 1970.
53 Harrison 1903, 1948.
54 Freud 1918, 1963; Jung 1987; Jung & Kerenyi 1951.
• historical approaches seeking to extract what little objective history may lie hidden under myth, and which we have already discussed above.

What often amazes the literary scholar (and a fortiori the literary writer), and even more so the owner of myths both in the North Atlantic and outside, is the sustained Faustian and tendency to appropriative, subordinating reduction inherent in such primarily analytical approaches to myth. I am not implying that these approaches specifically declare myths to be untruths and falsehoods, to be mistaken science; yet, clearly, they are only satisfied once the myth is deconstructed and transformed into some totally different statement which is no longer recognisable to the original owners of the myth.

Being ourselves owners, admirers, beauty-stricken commentators, and scholarly and literary transmitters, of myth we realise only too well that not rupture, but fusion, is existentially our most rewarding approach to myth. While the rupturist approach to myth may be situated in the Enlightenment, the fusionist approach is rather rooted (together with so much of enthusiastic scholarly research into myth and folktales from the early nineteenth century CE onwards) in subsequent Romanticism.

Our tasks as global intellectuals studying myth is thus situated between rupture and fusion, in the field of tension between

1. celebrating such myths as create and communicate – well in line with current notions of human dignity and self-realisation – beauty, cosmological meaning, sociability, self-respect, power and freedom (often through their transformative incorporation in literary, musical, dramatic and graphic artistic expression; or alternatively, through their underpinning an equitable social arrangement, a justified socio-political cause, or even more in general, because the myths in question are enshrined in the collective representations of our society); and

2. exploding the kinds of myths (ranging from, e.g., the male myth of the polluting female body, to the White myth of lazy, dirty and incompetent Blacks, the fascist myths of power, order and superiority, etc.) that so very often, result in the opposite of human dignity and self-realisation, – and having this result in principle by virtue of – mutatis mutandis – the very same mechanisms as summed up under (1).
6. The scholar’s adoption and celebration of myth

A field of tension,\textsuperscript{56} in order to be sustained, requires \textit{both} poles of a contradiction to persist. This means that the scholar must at the same time

- deconstruct myth, and,
- (deferring such deconstruction), \textit{adopt} and \textit{celebrate} myth.

At first glance, the adoption of myth and the pursuit of scholarship (as under (b)) would appear to be incompatible and mutually exclusive, but that is a premature and unjustified conclusion.

On the contrary, as literary scholars are well aware, we may engage in the identification and celebration of such literary, pictorial, ideological and political myths as may be argued to express and reinforce current notions of human dignity and self-realisation, in other words, such myths as may be invoked as demonstrations of more or less dominant and more or less unchallenged collective representations in the current wider society. In North Atlantic society, numerous are the literary critical studies that help us to identify and appreciate the overarching myths informing the details of a novelist’s, poet’s or playwright’s literary product.

Such myths may be described by critics in abstract terms that convey fundamental themes in present-day North Atlantic society: the quest for power, integrity and existential redemption; the conflict between individual drives and collective Super-Ego-type censorship, or between passionate love and official duty; productivity, creativity, transformation, trust, wisdom, gender balance, identity as the partial and contested outcome of life-long struggles; the fragmentation, performativity, absurdity and human failure inevitably attending such struggles and rendering them, in part, incredible. Here the models of man and of action that are proffered in the mythical narrative, overlap or even coincide with such models as inform social life in the mythological scholars’ own society. Of course, mythical models and social models, more or less, pattern and instigate the actual behaviour of human beings without ever totally determining it.

The application of ancient mythical material in concrete present-day contexts of literary and pictorial production, political oratory, etc. often takes a very specific form: \textit{that of the deliberate (typically archaicising) re-circulation of undisguised, stereotyped, ancient mythical contents in latter-day artistic products, with specific mythic protagonists in stereotyped interrelationships and evolving struggles with their respective opposites}. Here usually not the belief in the true historical existence of these protagonists and their mythical history is at stake, but the exemplary, emblematic use to which they

\textsuperscript{56} For the relevance of the concept of the ‘field of tension’ for the study of situations of interculturality, cf. van Binsbergen 2003a.
are put, allowing the latter-day artist or orator to juggle with standardised positions and relationships triggered by the mere mention of the all-familiar names of the mythical protagonists. The device is an example of intertextuality (latter-day literary products selectively and usually somewhat innovatively referring to ancient mythical texts). In the North Atlantic tradition, this peculiar re-circulation of clearly identified myths\textsuperscript{57} pervades Hellenistic, Ancient Roman, European medieval and modern literature and very far from extinct – to judge by such twentieth-century authors as the Irish James Joyce (\textit{Ulysses}, recycling the mythical contents of the Odyssey) and the Flemish Hugo Claus (\textit{Omtrent Deedee}, recycling the myth of the castration of Kronos and the birth of Aphrodite).\textsuperscript{58} Numerous other examples could be given outside the North Atlantic region, from mythical complexes as far-flung as the West African Sundjáta epic, the South and South East Asian Mahabhārata, Alexander/Iskander myths throughout Central, South and Southeast Asia, etc.\textsuperscript{59} The strange attraction of this inveterate literary device of ‘bringing ancient myth to life’ appears to lie in the deliberately ambivalent nature of the relationship between the mythical and the modern: the ancient standardised narrative shimmers through its modern trappings, adds extra force and meaning in it, organises the plot to some extent, yet must at the same time be craftily domesticated, customised, brought to local present-day life, and innovated so as to prevent that the ancient myth becomes intolerably dominant and freezes the life force of modern literary characters and their actions.

Literary scholars cannot convincingly handle such mythical material if they insist on the analytical rupture between themselves and the myth they, and the literary authors under scrutiny, are handling. Their literary comments are likely to become positively mythographic and mythopoetic (‘myth-making’), at the same time as scholarly and distant – and they may seek to convey and emulate, in their writings, something of the tension and the beauty that informs the mythically-orientated writing under scrutiny, in the first place.

A rather similar situation occurs in a particular form of anthropological engagement with living myth: when it is not the analytical, cross-culturally comparative stance of ethnology that prevails, but the active participation, as observer as well as temporary member, in present-day contexts in which the owners’ ceremonial or ritual enactment of myth constitutes the backbone of a social event. This situation is very far from excpe-

\textsuperscript{57} While the emphasis here is on Graeco-Roman myth, we are reminded that also Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other world religions have produced mythologies which, over the centuries, have frequently been recycled for literary purposes.

\textsuperscript{58} We only have to remind ourselves of the work of such poets as Yeats (Ireland) and Roland Holst (the Netherlands).

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Lombard 1993.
ional, and need not be exotically constructed. Imagine a young sociological field-worker whose Ph.D. research takes her to join the supporters of a prominent soccer club in their European peregrinations. The club’s identity, its symbolism through colours, verbal associations, standardised narratives of historical triumphs and defeats, and other attributes, will combine with those of the club’s present and past protagonists and corresponding features of the opponent clubs to bring out mythical dimensions of heroic struggle, defeat and victory towards which the fieldworker will often employ fusion, rather than rupture, as a personal position. And for those of my readership who insist that such a North Atlantic present-day example does not apply because myth – in their stereotypical opinion – has to be savoured in a typically exotic setting of totemism, magic, divination and bloody sacrifice, it is enough to be reminded of the many anthropologists, including myself, who have braved the tenets of their academic rationality and have actively adopted, on the basis of a considerable amount of cultural learning and of initiation, in the enactment of local African, Asian, Oceanic and American myth during fieldwork outside the North Atlantic. Back home, will they relapse into the appropriative, reductionist rupture in contrast to the fusion characterising their actual fieldwork? Or will they find the forms, literary more than scientific, and beyond the claims of a monopolised access to privileged truth, that will allow them to salvage, to render into discursive and evocative writing, the living myth they have encountered and embodied in the field; and will they do so in a fashion that invites the recognition, and the identification, of the owners of those myths?

Literary scholars often write about texts whose authors they have never met, whose authors may have long been dead. Ethnographers temporarily and vicariously living mythical contents within present-day local horizons (be they the Manchester United supporters scene, or Nkoya cults of kingship, or West African Pentecostal church services hinging on the diabolical qualities of globally circulating artefacts, and of moneys, that have not first been whitewashed through the church’s selective blessing) have more immediate reason to appreciate that the personal, practical participation in living myth, involving also the intersubjective understanding of myth at the owners’/narrators’ own

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60 Although it may very well be so constructed; cf. Venbrux 1995: an account of present-day anthropological fieldwork in North-western Australia, where violently conflictive relations between kin are – or so is Venbrux’s conviction on the basis of prolonged and traumatic participant observation – constantly informed, and articulated, by reference to mythical characters to whose mythical roles present-day protagonists in family dramas are irresistibly drawn. There are obvious parallels with the literary devices of Joyce and Claus as indicated above.

61 Cf. van Binsbergen 2003a.

terms, *is primarily an act of sociability*. By not explicitly and not publicly breaking out of the spellbound world constructions of shared living myth, one affirms one’s fellowship with the myth owners. Since many anthropological scholars (and North Atlantic students of myth in general) believe to have eradicated myth from their own professional subculture, and increasingly from North Atlantic culture in general, fusion as a mode of sharing myth is also a form of countering North Atlantic hegemonic assumptions, and creating a possible context for inter-cultural understanding; it admits the fundamental humility of the human condition, notably the unattainableness of a privileged position in intercultural encounters, unless through violence.

7. The scholar’s critical battle against myth

Such sociability through participation in living myth is far easier to achieve in expressive domains such as ritual, drama, orature, visual arts, than when myths consciously and explicitly address, discursively, the structure of the life world, as an unmistakable form of cognitive knowledge production. We have seen that the fundamental act of rupture in the study of myth consists in questioning the truth value of myth (by such standards as objectivity, universality and rationality – the three fundamental qualities which the Sandra Harding (1997) identifies as the central claims of Western science). Where, on the one hand, the fusionist student of myth would see affirmations of identity, standardised models for action, and the active creation of meaning and of empowerment often after long periods of oppression and denial, the rupturist, on the other hand, would prefer a literalist approach, where the myth is taken, not as myth in terms of our above definition, but as a pseudo-scientific statement of fact, to be assessed, deconstructed and (inevitably) exploded, with the same scientific rationality that constructs the rupturist position in the first place. It is in this way that the great majority of Afrocentrist, feminist, New Age, ethnic, nationalist and so-called fundamentalist (both Christian, Islamist, and Hinduist) writings and related discourses have been relegated (by a host of unsympathetic critics who tend to occupy positions of power in academia, the media, and government circles) to the domain of myth – not in recognition of the uniquely pivotal position of myth in the construction of any society including postmodern globality, but pejoratively, in contempt of the, allegedly, pseudo-scientific overtones such discourses tend to carry. Allegedly, I

63 Cf. van Binsbergen 2004.

64 On these and related issues, cf. van Binsbergen 2003a.

65 Cf. Toelken 2002, with regard to Native American handling of myth today.
say – for it is only one little step for such rupturist critics to be made to realise that also their own sacrosanct fortress of scientific rationality, objectivity and universality constitutes nothing but a myth – certainly in the sense of my definition as given above, and very likely also in the very pejorative sense (as ‘untruth’) which these critics give to ‘myth’ and, by implication, extend to the forms of contestation, alternative reflection and liberation enumerated above.

Here it becomes very manifest that one person’s myth is another person’s truth. There is no way in which a responsible intellectual producer can opt to dwell exclusively on one side, at one pole, of the field of tension between rupture and fusion. Complete fusion will mean a total abandonment of the great achievements of critical thought since the Enlightenment (and in fact, as the names of Xenophanes and Theagenes demonstrate, since the very beginning of Western philosophy).66 As intellectuals, we simply cannot allow ourselves, or even others, to live with an unchecked proliferation of myths that are not subjected to critical scrutiny. On the other hand, complete rupture will lead to the destruction, not only of the myth-underpinned life worlds of others, and of their identity (however much admitted to be constructed), but also of our own life world, in which scientific rationality, universality and objectivity can only exist to the extent to which these are themselves raised to the status of myth, and help to cosily cushion that life world amidst North Atlantic modern myths (such as democracy, the market, and human rights) – the latter myths being largely invisible to us, as myths, like the very air we breathe in.

8. A near-universal mytheme: ‘hero fights monster’

Bodies of mythological knowledge are among humankind’s oldest67 attested and best studied systems of knowledge. The recognition of the similarity of mythological patterns as found in distinct linguistic and cultural traditions was already a fact in Antiquity, when it inspired the practice of the interpretatio graeca:68 the projection of Greek mythological proper names and concepts onto the mythologies and ritual practices of the Egyptians, Scythian, Celts, etc. at the periphery of the Greek world — a practice well-known from

66 It is here that the uniquely constitutive role of Kant needs to be appreciated. But does Western philosophy have, independently, the monopoly of such scepticism? Probably not. Cf. Gupta 1981; Chinn 1997.

67 Cf. Witzel 2001, 2003; van Binsbergen 2005a. In these long-range studies certain myths are elaborately argued to have a time depth of well over 100,000 years.

the works of Herodotus and Plato. World-wide, the available mythological material is of an incredible wealth. This extensive corpus includes cases of myths of the most far-reaching continuity and convergence, and in this respect borders on the same spatial globality which Harding has,\(^{69}\) rightly, identified as a crucial factor in the universalism attributed to Western science. To make this point, I prefer to select only one \textit{mytheme}\(^{70}\), that of ‘hero fights monster’, and to study it by reference to just one, highly reliable and authoritative, source: the account of Fontenrose’s explorations into the charter myth of the famous Delphic oracle in Ancient Greece. The mytheme involves two archetypal characters, the hero and the adversary, to which often a third is added: the usually passive heroine.

The table demonstrates the truly amazing, nearly universal distribution of this mytheme across world cultures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>selected protagonists</th>
<th>selected enemies</th>
<th>selected passive heroines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African interior</td>
<td>Perseus</td>
<td>Ketos</td>
<td>Aso, Andromeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ammon, \textit{Athena / Neith}, Geb, Horus, \textit{Isis}, Min, Osiris, Ra, (Set), Thoth, \textit{Uto}</td>
<td>Apep, Bata, Busiris, the Sea, Set, (Thoth)</td>
<td>Anat, Asherat, \textit{(Isis)}, Nut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, South East Asia, Persia</td>
<td>Fredun = Thraetaona, Indra, (\textit{Kaikeyi});</td>
<td>Azzi Dahaka, \textit{Dana}, Garuda, \textit{Manthara}, Nahusha, Namuci, Ravana, Sinhika, Viparupa, Vritra;</td>
<td>\textit{(Kaikeyi)}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chu Yang, Li Ping, No Cha, Shen Yi, Yi, Ying Lung, Yu;</td>
<td>Ch’ih Yu, Chu Wang, dragon, Fung Po, Ho Po;</td>
<td>\textit{Hsi Wang Mu}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Agatamori, Amewakahiko, Izanagi, Ruiko, (Susanowo), Takenikazuchi;</td>
<td>Susanowo;</td>
<td>Amaterasu, Izanami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and Southern Europe</td>
<td>\textit{Athena / Neith}, Herakles, Melqart, Perseus;</td>
<td>Antaios, Atlas, Cae cus, Evander / Faunus, Geryon, Ophion;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{69}\) Harding 1997; cf., specially on the point of global distribution of myth, van Binsbergen 2002b.

\(^{70}\) I.e. ‘smallest meaningful unit of mythological narrative’.
| Greece                      | Apollo, Artemis, Athena, Dionysos, Erechtheus, Eros, Hekate, Herakles, Ia, Kadmos, Kronos, Pan, Poseidon, Uranos, Zeus [Keraunios] | Acheloos, Aigis, (Apollo), Ares, Delphyne, Despoina, Diomedes, (Dionysos), Drakon, Echidna, Gigantes, Glaukos, Hades, Hekate, Hera, (Herakles), (Hermes), Hydra, Kampe, Kepheus, Keto, Ker, (Kronos), Kyknos, Lamia, Laogoras, Laomedon, Linos, Neleus, Ocean = Oceanos, Ogygos, Pallas, (Percius), Phlegyas, Phorbas, Poine, Poseidon, Python, the Sea, Sphinx, Styx, Sybaris, Tartaros, Teiphusa, Thanatos, Theys, Titans, Triton, (Uranos), Zeus [Chthonios], Zeus’s hawk | Artemis, Deianeira, Demeter, Ge, Ia, Kelto, Leto, Moirai, Persephone, Rhea, Xeroidike |
| pre-Christian               | Bearson, Beowulf, Hagen, Odin, Ogier the Dane, Parzival, Sigurd / Siegfried, Sigmund, Thor | dragon, Fafnir, Firedrake, Grendel, Grendel’s Mother, Hel, Holda, Lorelei, Midgard Snake, Regin-Mimir, Valkyrie, Venus, Ymir | Audunlma, Brynhild, Krimhild, Lohengrin |
| Northern Europe             |                                          |                                          |                                          |
| Christian Europe            | St Evenmar, St George, St Michael | Satan, St George’s dragon, the Woman of Rev. 12 & 17 |                                          |
| Americas                    | Coyote, Gucumatz, Hunahpu, Xbalanque, Tahoe | Nashtlah, Xibalba, Vucub-Caquix, Wishpoosh |                                          |

Table 1. A near-universal theme of systems of mythological knowledge: ‘hero fights monster’. Table compiled on the basis of scattered information contained in: Fontenrose 1980. Italics denote female characters.

What could explain the persistence and global distribution of this mytheme? At the end of his long quest for comparative data, scanning the local and cultural specifics of the mytheme ‘hero fights monster’, Fontenrose falls short of inspiration, and all he can offer us is an appeal to the universal human condition in the face of death. Yet, as we shall see in the next sections, this persistence of global distribution also imply an invitation to engage in the study of long-range comparative world mythology on a grand scale – as in the work of Michael Witzel and his Harvard network, within which also my own recent work situates itself.

9. Living with the tensions: Towards a specialised scholarship of myth

The field of tension between rupturist and fusionist approaches to myth, signalled above, is too productive than that we should try and resolve that tension by a radical retreat from living myth – which is impossible anyway because we cannot live without collective representations. Yet the contradictions of scholarship produce a relative compartmentalisation in time and place that allows us to engage, as specialists (and only for that part of our existence where we can identify as specialists), in the detached study of myths as if they were exclusively other people’s. In this respect the possibilities suggested by Table 1 alone are dazzling: there is the suggestion of an underlying pattern informing an incredible variety of cultures in the Old and the New World, across millennia. Is the study of myth a road to the recognition of very old layers of a very widely shared worldview?
Or does it, instead, reveal the innate tendencies built into the universal human mind? Detached myth analysis is not only constitutive of the Western intellectual tradition and especially of the Enlightenment – it is one of the most fascinating intellectual activities one could engage in.

Over the past decades, I have personally, intensely, and from a variety of different angles grappled with the study of myth. In certain aspects of this work I have identified as a fusionist:

- using my position as a North Atlantic scholar to proclaim and defend an attenuated form of Afrocentrism, as reformulated by me in the context, and in the terms, of scientific rationality,
- and using my anthropological fieldwork to become a practicing diviner-priest (sangoma) in the Southern African tradition, propagating that practice worldwide through the Internet, and seriously, incisively analysing that field of knowledge in its own right with a methodology inspired by both mainstream North Atlantic science, and sangoma knowledge.

But in many other respects my studies as a mythical scholar have tended to rupture, to analytical distance. This has been the case for my early study of myth in a North African sacred landscape, and, largely, for my attempts to unravel – mainly on the basis of local myth and oral tradition – the precolonial post-1500 CE history of state formation, gender relations and ethnicity in western central Zambia; but particularly for my more recent probings into long-range mythical ramifications:

- mythical continuity of dualist mythical structures informing the worldwide history of, mainly, geomantic divination (including the Arabic, African, and European Renaissance forms) ever since its remotest traces in the Ancient Near East
- mythical continuity between Ancient Greece and Ancient Egypt, in the context of the Black Athena debate (an idea I now consider obvious – cf. Table 2 below – and perhaps even almost pedestrian, for being over-obvious, because from a long-range perspective comprising dozens of millennia and all continents, like my latest work on leopard symbolism, the affinities between the Egyptian and Greek mythological repertoire are only too predictable, both straddling Afro-Asiatic and Indo-European varieties of Nostratic, in the same narrow horizon of the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the Extended Fertile Crescent)71

71 Very recently I have returned to comparative mythology in the context of the Ancient Mediterranean, because it is here that important clues may be found as to the provenance and interethnic relations of the Sea Peoples who, at the end of the Bronze Age, destroyed the Hittite empire and
• mythical themes which connect South Central African kingship with South and South East Asia and the Ancient Near East
• mythical themes emerging in long-range patterns of animal symbolism across the Old World, as exemplified in clan names, divination systems, and systems of astronomical nomenclature
• mythical themes emerging in long-range continuities in leopard nomenclature and symbolism as a perspective on the world history of shamanism
• African cosmogonic (‘creation’) myths, the Out-of-Africa package c. 140,000 Before Present (BP), and the mythical implications of Back-to-Africa return migration from Asia as from ca. 20,000 BP.72

In conclusion, it is the leopard theme that I will now discuss in some detail.73

10. The leopard’s unchanging spots: Example of an interdisciplinary approach to an African mythical complex

Using such auxiliary approaches as Lévi-Straussian structuralism, long-range comparative linguistics (in terms of such macro families as Nostratic, Dene-Sino-Caucasian etc.), population genetics (Cavalli-Sforza and his school), archaeology, the history of art, the study of ancient astronomies and other specialist knowledge systems, cultural anthropological perspectives on the distribution of specific traits (especially with regard to ritual and belief) in space and time, and multivariate statistical analysis, I have recently engaged in indicate a form a long-range myth analysis whose main results may be summarised as follows:

1. Rather than exclusively committing oneself to one pole of the rupture/fusion tension in the study of myth, a combination of these stances is the most productive for innovative research; thus, in the best fusionist tradition, my leopard project started out on the basis of an existential puzzle imposed on me by a high priest in Botswana during my final confirmation as a sangoma, but it has triggered an analytical rupturist en-

threatened Egypt; cf. van Binsbergen, in press. To my delight, Goto 2005 covers much of the same ground but with a different objective.


73 van Binsbergen forthcoming (a); an extensive slide presentation covering much of the book’s argument (van Binsbergen 2003c) is available at: http://shikanda.net/ancient_models/leopard/leopardwww.htm.
deavour whose value, if any, is no longer dependent on these anecdotal origins; the
same incidentally applies to my geomantic studies.

2. Continuity in myth, across continents and across millennia, is not merely the perspec-
tival illusion of those who, constitutionally, happen to be ‘lumpers’ rather than ‘split-
ters’\(^\text{74}\) – on the contrary such continuity is a very well established empirical fact (cf. Table 1). But of course, the scientific value of such an assertion is fully dependent
upon the theoretical and methodological care with which such a position, or its oppo-
site, is elaborated. The main finding in my leopard research to support the claim of
continuity is: the disconcerting constancy, not only in the lexical nomenclature of the
leopard from Khoi-San (now in Southern Africa) to Sino-Tibetan (East Asia), Afro-
Asiatic (northern Africa and West and Central Asia) and Indo-European (Europe, West and Central Asia) but also and particularly of the mythical significance of the
notion of *speckledness* – as if throughout the Old World (and probably also in the Na-
Dene domain of the New World) a 15,000-years-old mythical cosmology may be
traced hinging on the juxtaposition of speckledness versus textural homogeneity, dark
versus light, evil versus good, female versus male.

3. Classic diffusionism, cultural anthropology’s main stock-in-trade in the late 19th and
early 20th century, lacked a theory of cultural borrowing and cultural integration, and
was therefore rightly replaced by the (now again obsolete) paradigm of structural
functionalism stressing narrow horizons of time and place, virtually total cultural in-
tegration within such a local horizon, and participatory fieldwork as the standard an-
thropological technique to explore such horizons. Diffusion as a paradigm deserves to
be revived, provided the well-known and well-taken criticism levelled against it by
structural-functionalism is seriously answered at the theoretical and methodological
level. And it is being revived (cf. Amselle 2001), notably in the context of recent
studies of (proto-) globalisation, and of a recent rapprochement between anthropology
and archaeology.

4. One methodological problem in this respect is the recognition, or rejection as the case
may be, of underlying similarity or identity in the face of manifest dissimilarity on the
surface. Here Lévi-Straussian structuralism remains a uniquely powerful and inter-
subjective analytical tool. It allows us to see myths in adjacent spaces and times as
systematically interrelated through specific transformations, underneath of which the
same deep structure may be systematically detected. It has managed to create order
throughout New World mythologies, illuminates Indo-European mythologies,\(^\text{75}\) helps
us to argue Egyptian/Greek continuities in myth, and deserves to be systematically
extended to African and Ancient Near Eastern mythologies, as in my own work in
progress.

\(^{74}\) The expression has a long history in historical linguistics, cf. Baxter & Ramer 2000.

\(^{75}\) Cf. Oosten 1985.
5. Such a structuralist historical reading of myth complexes may help us towards solving the perennial question of how to demarcate the effects of parallel invention and of innate parallel programming of the – anatomically modern – human mind, as against diffusion. Another problem is how to pinpoint the specific kind of diffusion that is informing such widespread continuity. Accepted anthropological wisdom is that not populations travel, taking both their gene pool, their language, and their distinctive culture with them, but that populations remain more or less immobile or move only very slowly across the earth’s surface, whereas the travelling of ideas, objects, and isolated individuals is largely held responsible for such diffusion as in fact has unmistakably taken place. My leopard research, however, suggests that the model of demic diffusion, which increasingly informs present-day archaeology and genetics, has also some utility for the long-range study of both myth and language family. The distribution of myths, therefore, can be demonstrated to be related to that of genetic patterns and language (macro-) families. However, in order to account for such unexpected long-range continuities as the nomenclature and symbolism of the leopard bring out, a multi-tiered model of demic diffusion seems required, where relatively constant nuclei are carried from one major wave to the next, somewhat comparable with the genetic immortality of human procreative cells from generation to generation. I have called this multi-tiered model the ‘fireworks model’; diagram 1.

6. The succession of tiers brings out a historical sequence whose phases (each coinciding with a particular tier) do not necessarily have the same contents and structure. While in every tier, myths create life worlds and make these saturated with truth and meaning for the myth owners, these life worlds are demonstrably different. My long-range, comparative research into leopard symbolism has yielded evidence to postulate the following sequence informing a systematic of cosmologies in identifiable spatio-temporal contexts throughout the Old World:

   a. the mythical cosmology hinges on the mythical leopard–ungulate juxtaposition, which reflects Lower and Middle Palaeolithic situations (4,000,000 to 40,000 BP) directly inspired by natural conditions (for the ungulates are the leopard’s nature prey), in a context closely associated with early shamanism; inspired by the unpredictability of a hunting mode of production, images of the leopard help to give rise to the widespread mythical figure of a divine trickster
   
   b. The mythical leopard–lion juxtaposition hinges on speckledness and brings together, because of the power of human symbolic thought, two species that (although competing for the same preys and therefore occasionally mortal enemies) usually avoid each other under natural conditions but that are eminently ‘good for thinking’ (Lévi-Strauss), in considerable abstraction from

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naturally given situations (for lion and leopard are not each other’s nature partners or prey – although their competition over the same prey animals may lead them to confront each other); this reflects an Upper Palaeolithic condition (40,000 to 10,000 BP)

Diagram 1. The model of multi-tiered demic diffusion:

(3) the ‘fireworks’ model: within a previous tier a kernel is engendered that grows into the next tier, which is highly different yet represents some continuity with the tier from which it has sprung – like cascading fireworks. The ‘fireworks’ model (3) is here contrasted with

(2) the ‘rainbow’ model (which is in line with my earlier theoretical position to the effect that ‘cultures do not exist’): differences and boundaries between cultures are fluid, both horizontally (in space) and vertically (in time); and with

(1) the model of discrete (or simple) demic diffusion, which is based on the simple succession of totally discontinuous cultures. 77

77 This illustration derives from van Binsbergen 2003c.
c. The leopard–lion juxtaposition was subsequently, in early Neolithic times (Çatal Hüyük, the fertile Neolithic Sahara), worked into an elaborate, utterly dualistic (also gendered) ‘cosmology of the lion and the leopard’, traces of which are found all over the Old World, in Kammerzell’s lexical pair *prd/*prg (‘leopard’, where the -pard element itself is an example of this root) versus *rw/*hw/*LB’/*leu (‘lion’), and mythically elaborated in von Sicard’s Luwe78 (with a great many name variants) mythical figure, paired with a female companion Mwari (also with a great many name variants). Significantly, we are here in the domain of the few language families that have gender: Afro-Asiatic, Indo-European, and Khoi-San; for all three families a West Asian origin c. 15,000 BP may be very tentatively postulated.

d. Cosmological/astronomical notions accrue to these figures, so that the leopard’s skin comes to represent the star-spangled sky especially the circumpolar northern sky and the night, while the celestial axis, noon, and the ecliptic comes to be associated with the lion; the pole, spear, stick, club (representing the celestial axis) is one of Luwe’s most conspicuous attributes.

e. This cosmology is implicitly immanentist in the terms set out in section 2 of this paper, in that its paired constituent elements are complementary, and readily transform into each other, without very sharp boundaries. However, the emergence of writing, the state, organised priesthood and science in Late Neolithic times created the conditions for the emergence of transcendentalist modes of thought. When transcendentalist thought emerges, the ancient cosmology of the lion and the leopard offers the mythical framework for dualist cosmologies of death and rebirth, often expressed through leopard or tiger skin garments (what I have called pardivesture), whose converging symbolism can be traced throughout the successive civilisations of the Ancient Near East (Indus, Sumer, Egypt, Greece, with ramifications into South Asia and China). A cluster of leopard-associated goddesses (Cybele, Hera, Aphrodite, Circe), and male figures vicariously associated with them (Dionysus, Orpheus, Jason, Menelaus, Antenor), merges with goddesses combining feminine attributes (spinning, childbirth) with military prowess: Neith, Athena, Anath, Anahita, with more distant resonances in the weaving goddesses Proserpina and Harmonia, with the African spider goddess Anansi/Nzambi/Nyambi, and with the leopard or tiger associated South Asian goddesses of death and transformation Durga and Kali. From this complex but consistent repertoire springs the Osirian/Orphic/Dionysian/Christian tradition – a prime source of transcendentalism that has largely shaped Europe and the Near East in the last few millennia. All this testifies to a gradual but most fundamental shift in gender power, with male gods and male

prerogatives replacing female ones in the millennia between the early Neolithic and the early Iron Age.79

f. In post-Neolithic Africa the Luwe complex is widespread but fragmented and little incorporated in current cultures, as if it were a remnant of a West Asian / northeastern African context which (at least, according to my tentative reconstructions, which are in part inspired by recent genetic findings as to a Back-into-Africa return migration from Asia), appears to have coincided with the emergence of Khoi-San and Niger-Congo as language families. The cosmology of the lion and the leopard has not survived in Africa as an integrated dualist complex, instead the leopard has largely shed its complement the lion, and has taken on (or reverted back to) the immanalist shape of the Exalted Insider – power-hungry and treacherous. Nonetheless, Sacred Outsiders, full of leopard-skin symbolism, are to be found in an eastern and northern fringe of sub-Saharan African, as an interface with the Eurasian domain of transcendentalism centring on the Sacred Outsider. (diagram 2)

These are some of the findings which I am currently working into my book *The leopard’s unchanging spots: Long-range comparative research as a key to enduring patterns of African agency*. I have no illusions about the reception that book is to expect.80 In African Studies and in anthropology, myth is no longer the hot issue it was in the 1950s and 1960s; new myths, such as globalisation and multiculturalism, have taken that place. And I have obliged by incorporating these themes into my recent work. Given this unpopularity (especially in African Studies), my current mythical studies (in the stricter sense of the word) are likely to be relegated, in their own right, to the status of

79 Ye Shuxian 2003 makes clear that also for China there is evidence of the early prominence of a female goddess (identified by him with the Nü Wa 女媧 of Chinese tradition), to be subjugated and eclipsed by a male god (identified with the culture hero Fu Xi 伏羲 of Chinese tradition). This is in line with the Chinese strands in my own analysis of leopard symbolism, which tends to revolve on the mother goddess and/or her junior male companion. These strands include: the conspicuous place of the Dene-Sino-Caucasian linguistic group in leopard nomenclature in four continents; and ‘Dionysian’ and ‘Osirian’ themes (not necessarily to be taken to have diffused from a postulated origin in the Ancient Near East and South East Europe) in classical Chinese iconography and symbolism, especially in the imperial context, where also the leopard, bao 豹, is conspicuous.

80 A first indication is already given in the scornful and dismissive treatment of my ‘neo-diffusionism’ in the otherwise commendable book by my friend Jean-Luc Amselle (2001: 31f, 98f).
pseudo-scientific myth, and to be denied validity. In terms of the framework sketched above, however, that would be rather high praise, even though probably unjustified.

Ultimately, such an analysis conveys the following lesson: Myth cannot be studied in isolation – far more illuminating is an interdisciplinary approach that combines a number of long-range research efforts, from genetics to archaeology and from linguistics to comparative ethnography.

Diagram 2. The five prominent instances of pardivesture (‘the ceremonial or ritual wearing of leopard skins’) in Africa during the second millennium CE. These are, from west to east and from north to south: bards; Islamic saints; Nilotic leopard-skin chiefs; kings; and diviner-priests in the Southern African *sangoma* tradition. My intercontinental comparative and historical analysis of leopard symbolism suggests that these five instances may be interpreted as being situated at the interface between two very extensive cultural domains, and as resulting from the recent (2nd millennium CE) interaction between these domains: (a) the implicitly transcendentalist domain of the leopard-skin wearer as the Sacred Outsider (usually with shamanistic connotations), widely distributed in the Old World except in West and South-West Africa; and (b) the implicitly immanentist domain of the leopard-skin wearer as the Exalted Insider (usually without shamanistic connotations), in West and South-West Africa.81

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81 Also this illustration is derived from van Binsbergen 2003c.
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