A century of dialogue around Durkheim as a founding father of the social sciences

by Wim van Binsbergen

Emeritus Professor of Intercultural Philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, Erasmus University Rotterdam

wimvanbinsbergen@gmail.com

1. Introduction

In 2012 social scientists, philosophers and religious scientists celebrated the centennial of the publication of one of the most seminal books in the modern study of religion, *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*, by the then leading French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s (1858-1917); in 2017, we commemorated that author’s untimely death at age 59, broken by World War I in which he lost his only son and many of his beloved students. Educated, first as a Rabinnical student then as a modern philosopher, Durkheim earned his place among French thinkers primarily as a ‘Founding Father’ of the social sciences. Having recently (on the basis of a life-long preoccupation) devoted a book-length study to Durkheim’s religion theory, the purpose of this essay is to highlight major aspects of Durkheim as an exponent of French thought. I shall first briefly situate Durkheim in his time and age, with special emphasis on his political views and his ethnic identity as a secularised Jew. Then

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2 van Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2018, *Confronting the sacred: Durkheim vindicated through philosophical analysis, ethnography, archaeology, long-range linguistics, and comparative mythology*, Hoofddorp: Shikanda Press; also at: [http://www.quest-journal.net/shikanda/topicalities/naar%20website%208-2018/Table_of_contents.htm](http://www.quest-journal.net/shikanda/topicalities/naar%20website%208-2018/Table_of_contents.htm)
we turn to Durkheim’s relation with the discipline in which he was originally trained, philosophy. We shall pay attention to the complex relationship between Durkheim and Kant, and further highlight his dualism, his epistemology, his views on primitive classification, his puzzling realism, the place of emergence in his thought, and his moralist tendencies. We shall end with articulating Durkheim’s transition to sociology, and how he gave over the torch of emerging sociology to his main students. Having thus created an adequate context in which to discuss Durkheim’s final masterpiece, *Les Formes*, and the still dominant theory of religion it expounds, we shall yet have to stop short there, due to constraints of space.

However, even this early in my argument let us dwell a bit on *Les Formes*. The African American sociologist Karen Fields in 1995 published a brilliant new translation of Durkheim’s masterpiece,⁢ to replace the 1915 Swain one, and in the decades to follow she was a vocal commentator on the French thinker’s work. Much to her credit, she has been one of the few to articulate⁴ the significance of the fact that Durkheim, from his comfortable armchair West European White urban elite position (though occupying something of a periphery there as an ethnic Jew), and in an age of colonialism and racism, saw no problem in selecting the Australian Aboriginals⁵ as the exemplary carriers of the ‘elementary forms of religious life’ of the whole of humankind. In the context of *Cultures and Dialogue* this is a most significant fact, in shining contrast with the tendency towards racialism and cultural condescension that was the hallmark of anthropology until the mid-20th c. CE.

Not all of Fields’s points are well-taken. In passing, and sweepingly equating massive Black activism in the 20th-c. CE USA with the far more limited Dreyfus affair of fin-de-siècle France, Fields depicts Durkheim as some kind of social activist of the type propagated by Marxists in the mid-20th century – the ones that learn theoretical insights from social contestation, from practice;⁶ although in Durkheim’s case that would have been, not (that would have been asking too much) for the sake of inequalities based on skin pigmentation, nor those based on class, but on ethnic and religious affiliation – Jewry, in other words. Boldly chiding main-stream sociology as ‘glib formulas about the “social construction” of “collective identities”’

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(into which she alleges Durkheim’s insights to have been bowdlerised in our time and age), Fields signals sweepingly that

‘we lose sight of the living subjects and active verbs by which Durkheim arrived at the hard-won discoveries of Forms.’

It is a most laudable picture, well-intended, idealised, but also one we could expect from a sociologist who, after mainly documentary research on Zambian religious movements in the 1970s, subsequently seems to have withdrawn onto the tower of high social theory. The truth of Les Formes, if any, should not have been learned by Durkheim in his (none too extensive) participation in the Dreyfus affair, but by prolonged fieldwork among the poverty-stricken, displaced and utterly rejected Australian Aboriginals, with the proverbial sweat, blood and tears that attends all good fieldwork (which makes fieldwork truly a practice that produces truth). The amazingly non-racialist choice in favour of the Australian Blacks as Durkheim’s showpiece of humanity and its religion, was lofty, and appeals to us Africans and African Americans, but methodologically such ‘ethnography by proxy’ was not in the least a sufficient condition for the production of any truth whatsoever.

Did Durkheim truly believe (as many later commentators have reproached him for) to have captured, with the Australian Aboriginals, the most primitive form of religion? He was well aware that the Australians had millennia of cultural history behind them,

‘comme tous les peuples connus’

He believed that studying what he thought was a relatively simple form of religion, would bring out the essence of the topic most clearly – although his reasons for classifying religions into simpler and more complex varieties remain unspecified, and no doubt are indebted to the evolutionism en vogue in his time. Surely, studies of Australian systems of social and natural classification have revealed the extreme complexities of that continent’s cultures, as compared to which those of the Ancient Greeks, the Ancient Chinese, modern folk culture in Western Europe, or some African systems of

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thought, appear to be wonders of simplicity and transparency... And let us not think that, even without fieldwork of his own, Durkheim stumbled ignorantly into the Australian Aboriginal world, or lazily warped the ethnographic data to fit his theories. One and a half decades of library studies and preliminary but published reviews and synthetic instalments on vital aspects of social organisation (e.g. clan system, incest) went into the preparation of his final book, in the course of which he devoured any scrap of relevant ethnographic information, in whatever international language, on which he could lay hands on.

2. Durkheim against the background of his time and age

2.1. Durkheim’s political views

Durkheim had a keen eye for the political developments in his native country, France, at the time. During his lifetime (1858-1917) that country went through a period of restored monarchy under Napoleon III, was defeated in the war with Prussia (1870), knew internal turmoil (the Commune de Paris) which ended in the Third Republic, and after a period of relative prosperity, bliss and colonial expansion in Africa and Asia, was drawn into World War I (1914-1918). The question of socio-political stability loomed large in Durkheim’s theoretical concerns. Here he expected far more from consensual symbolic / moral integration of a nation than from forceful, possibly violent, contestation along the line of Marxism, then emerging as a major theoretical and social force throughout Europe. Often Durkheim is mentioned in connection with the conservative French philosophers de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre, who preceded him by a century. They certainly helped to construct a framework within which Durkheim’s thought about society and the state could take fruition, but they lacked the social and religious emphasis through which Durkheim’s work gave a unique impetus to the development of the social sciences.

With decolonisation, globalisation, the transition to post-capitalism, the rise and fall of the welfare state, the outlines of North Atlantic society today differ greatly from those in Durkheim’s time, but his political views continue to reflect and inspire neo-liberal thought (Greve 1998). In the important Wolff collection on Durkheim major contributions by Coser and Richter examine the political aspect of Durkheim’s thought. Fittingly, an important part of Alexander & Smith’s 2005 Cambridge Companion to Durkheim, has been devoted to a section dealing with such political implications, under the heading ‘Solidarity, difference, and morality’. Recently, James Dingley (2015)

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has explored the present-day applicability to modern Ireland, of Durkheim’s analyses in the field of political sociology.\footnote{Dingley, James, 2015, Durkheim and National Identity in Ireland, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.}

The history of France in Medieval and Early Modern times was largely the history of the interaction between a secular dynastic state and aristocratic class on the one hand, and on the other hand the Christian Church and its hierarchy (or rather, since the Reformation in Early Modern times, the Roman Catholic Church as well as Protestant denominations). As late as the 17th c. CE, the centralisation of the French state was to a considerable extent the work of a high-ranking Roman Catholic official, Cardinal de Richelieu. However, during the Enlightenment agnostic, even atheist thought gained terrain, the Jesuits (for centuries procurers of the best formal education) were expelled from France in 1764, and the Revolution (1789-1795) proclaimed a secular socio-political order. These developments resulted in the fact that in 1871, and especially with the 1905 Law of the Separation of the Churches and the State, France would write la laïcité (i.e. ‘the absence of religion from public life’) into its very constitution. Considering the ideological and constitutional-legal significance of the notion of laïcité in modern France (recently reinforced by the conflicts on the visibility of Islam in the public sphere), it stands to reason that especially Durkheim’s more recent commentators dwell repeatedly and at length on this topic.\footnote{Baubérot, Jean, 1990, ‘Note sur Durkheim et la laïcité’, special issue, ‘Relire Durkheim’, Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 35, 69: 151-156; Hayat, Pierre, 2007, ‘Laïcité, fait religieux et société’, Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 52, 137: 9-20.} In Durkheim’s time, French society went through a phase when anticlericalism was politically correct, and the constitutional separation of church and state (i.e. laïcité) was self-evident, as were secular schools. On these points Durkheim was simply a child of his time and age, he championed them, and the only thing that needs surprise us is that, nonetheless, his statements on the incomparable social merits and truthful reality of religion could attain such pathos as one would only expect from a true believer. But was he?

2.2. Durkheim as a Jew

Against the background of France’s insistence on laïcité, Durkheim occupied a somewhat precarious position as an originally Jewish leading academician (hailing from a Rabbinical family and himself a former Rabbinical student), and as author of a theory radically relegating all religious belief to a societal basis. Therefore the question as to the impact of Judaism on Durkheim’s theoretical outlook deserves close attention.

Substantial aspects of this problematic are addressed in Strenski’s (1997; also cf. Pickering 2000) book on Durkheim and the French Jewry, and in Strenski’s contribution to the Idinopoulos & Wilson’s collective volume (2002). Reviewing Strenski’s book, the prolific Durkheim commentator the African American Karen Fields observed (1999: 172) that whereas decades ago the master’s Jewish connection could be dealt with, by Talcott Parsons, in a few lines and in passing, more recently a full book is not even enough.\footnote{Strenski, Ivan, 1997, Durkheim and the Jews of France, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Idinopoulos,
After Jews had often been the objects of contempt, exclusion, exploitation, and persecution ever since the Middle Ages, Durkheim wrote at a time of Jewish gradual emancipation in Western Europe including France, despite the notorious Dreyfus affair (1894-1906; Durkheim was among the petitioners clamouring in 1898 for retrial of the evidently innocent Jewish Alsatian Captain Dreyfus). However, scarcely two decades after Durkheim’s death in 1917, mounting antisemitism resulted in the Holocaust extermination of European Jewry under Hitler’s Third Reich, an unprecedented slaughter of 6,000,000 people within a few years. In the course of the 20th c. CE, the USA (with – as a result of immigration in the late 19th c. CE) the largest Jewish population in the world) became the global centre of academic sociological production as well as the liberator (together with the armies of the USSR) of the Nazi concentration camps with their predominantly Jewish prisoners. Any discussion of Durkheim’s Jewish antecedents is necessarily to be informed by awareness of Nazi-perpetrated crimes. By the 1970s, the consolidation of the state of Israel upon time-honoured Palestinian lands, two international oil crises, and the Iranian revolution in the name of fundamentalist Islam, tilted the scales again, and brought new global pretexts for antisemitism and violence. As I am writing this, antisemitism is dramatically rising again in Europe, causing hundreds of French, German and Dutch intellectuals to petition their government for protective action. But on the other hand, the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the state of Israel in 2018 coincided with the killing of more than 60 Palestinian demonstrators, and in more recent years violence against Palestinians was continued with massive bombing (albeit in a mutual exchange) and exclusion from Covid-19 vaccination.

Let us safely return to Durkheim’s work. What could be so typically Jewish about his conception of the sacred, which is at the heart of Les Formes? The ancient Hebrew root וֹדֶשׁ qdš, ‘sacred’ is attributed to Canaanitic, another Semitic language, with semantics ‘to separate, to set apart’. It is very isolated, and does not ascend etymologically to the phylum (Semitic) or macrophylum (Afroasiatic) level, let alone to *Borean – the oldest reconstructible language form, considered to have been spoken in Central to East Asia in the Upper Palaeolithic, c. 25 ka BP. In Wokart’s words:15

‘Im Alten Testament bezeichnet [Heiligkeit] die Göttlichkeit Gottes selbst, die sich in Macht und Herrlichkeit offeriert (Exodus 15a; Isaiah 526); so wird alles, was zu Gott in Beziehung steht, “heilig” genannt, die himmlischen Wesen, der Mensch, den Gott zu seinem Dienst sich weihet, und sogar die kultische Gegenstände (Deuteronomy 333; I Samuel 7:3; I Kings 8:4). Durch die eschatologische Wende des Neuen Testaments tritt das im Alten Testament vorherrschende dingliche Element gegenüber dem personalen zurück, wodurch sich dann das theologische Problem stellt, wie [Heiligkeit] als Gott allein zukommender Wesensbegriff und zugleich als Begriff für die durch die Gnade gerechtfertigte Kreatur gedacht werden kann’ (I Corinthians 1:30).


The above Old Testament verses, saturated with logocentricity like all sacred religious texts, already unmistakably contain, in a nutshell, Durkheim’s thinking on the sacred. Wokart suggests that this Israelite/Jewish conception of the sacred, although informing subsequent Christian, Scholastic and Early Modern theology and philosophy right up to Kant, was fairly distinctive in the Ancient World. Although this could be endlessly elaborated by philological and theological analysis of a much more specialist and erudite nature than I command, the Jewish roots of Durkheim’s sacred are thus sufficiently identified. In the background we perceive another absolute distinction peculiar to Judaism: the opposition between קאשָר, ‘clean, permitted’ [food], and its opposite (for which there seems to be no general term, but cf. Yiddish טרײַפָה, ‘torn by a predator’, replicated in the Arabic/Islamic opposition between حلال, ‘pure, allowed for consumption’, and حرام, ‘forbidden’. However, we must not jump to conclusions on the basis of this short and superficial exploration. In his impressive study of Germanic cultural and political history through the medium of language history, the British philologist Green (1998) claims that a ‘permitted/prohibited’ division similar to the Hebrew (<-Semitic<Afroasiatic) one may be detected at the root of the Germanic (<Indoeuropean<Eurasian) lexicon of ‘sacrifice’, even though the linguistic (and, considering recent history, emotional) affiliation of the two cases could scarcely be further apart. Also the great Christian theologian Söderblom, in his lemma on ‘holiness: general and primitive’ in Hastings’s authoritative Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (1909-1921), implicitly maintains that the Israelite conception is rather continuous with much more ethnographic data world-wide. This opens the possibility that, even though undeniably Jewish on the surface, Durkheim’s approach may yet be less particular, in space and time, to the Jewish/Israelite heritage alone, and may contain something of the ‘elementary forms of religious life’, after all. However, scholar’s renderings of a religious tradition different from their own cannot be taken at face value, and an alternative reading of the same situation would be that the scholarly interpretations by Green and Söderblom were unintentionally contaminated by Durkheim’s (whom Söderblom cites) so that my suggestion of a peculiar Jewish/Israelite perspective may stand.

In Durkheim’s religion theory, a major role is further played by the concept of effervescence: an altered state of consciousness, where individuality is supposed to have given way to great collective excitement over the blessings which society allegedly bestows upon us. Even though Durkheim was fortunate never to have experienced a pogrom, such antisemitic mass slaughters were already going on in Eastern Europe during his lifetime and had triggered a westbound mass migration of Azkenazy Jews. And as a contemporary of Tarde and Le Bon, he might have realised, even a few decades before Nazism and World War II, and half a century before Girard, that this kind of gesundes Volksempfinden is also what one risks taking on board when putting one’s faith in effervescence. In Durkheim’s time already, every intellectual

\[\text{16} \] The word ‘logocentric’ is used by Post-structuralist philosophers, especially Derrida, to denote the text-centredness associated with the emergence, ca. 5 ka BP, and the subsequent installation at the heart of society, of the package of writing, the state, organised religion and proto-science.


\[\text{18} \] German: ‘healthy popular pastime/experience’ – the Nazi expression for patriotic collective activities propagating Hitler’s Third Reich.
had access to knowledge about the persecution of Jews in Medieval Western Europe, as well as about the Inquisition and the Christian auto-da-fe’s in the New World when not only Jews but also Muslims and any non-Christians were the victims, while such staged events also emulated an astonishing level of religious mass murder in the form of human sacrifice that, before the arrival of the Europeans, had been endemic among Aztecs, Incas, and their regional neighbours – all blatant acts of violence perpetrated in the name of religion. In this light we may ask the following question: was Durkheim’s surprising, dogged belief in the moral powers of religion to bring out the best in humankind, perhaps primarily: the expression of a Jew’s desperate hope that history would not repeat itself? Or even, beyond even the anxiety over collective survival which has been part of the shared history of Jewry, do we encounter here an implicit but constant trait of Jewish diasporic culture across two millennia – an irrational optimism also found in otherwise very different Jewish thinkers such as Spinoza, Derrida, Buber and Levinas, to the effect that fundamentally the human condition is not totally hopeless, that all is well as long as existential awareness of the Name is not lost?

Fortunately, other commentators have displayed greater subtlety than Simpson & Conklin (and I myself?) in their approach to Durkheim against the background of Judaism. The latter, in his otherwise extremely enthusiastic review of Nielsen (1999), sounds the following, well-taken note of caution in regard of interpreting Durkheim’s work from a Jewish angle:

‘Nielsen makes certain broad claims to the diverse influences on Durkheim, from Aristotle and Bacon to Spinoza and Renouvier. He also attempts to tie his understanding of society and of the individual to Durkheim’s Jewish heritage, and he situates Durkheim within a line of Jewish thinkers ranging from Philo of Alexandria through Maimonides to Spinoza. This less-than-successful tack leaves the reader unconvincing. Philo, Maimonides, and Spinoza were highly complex thinkers and their relation to the Jewish tradition could not have been more diverse. While it is no doubt true that one senses a deep Jewish resonance in Durkheim’s writings, especially in his conceptions of the self and its relation to community (as in his idea of the sacred), much more serious work needs to be done in this direction than the casual and unsubstantiated remarks Nielsen throws out.’ (Seligman 2000)

An even bolder attempt to fathom the, unconscious if need be, depth of Durkheim’s Jewishness is made by Philip Wexler (2008), when he seeks to interpret something as aetherial as the possible significance of the lack of mention of a Jewish Messianic tradition – an omission of which both Durkheim and Freud are found guilty; both were, of course, secular Jews with an almost unrivalled impact on the intellectual life of the 20th c. – and who believes he can make out in Durkheim, an undercurrent of

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19 Perhaps a Messianism gone underground, as Wexler 2008 suggests, to whom we shall turn shortly.


Hasidic thought...Farfetched though this may seem in a renegade Jew exploding transcendent religion into a societal device, Wexler may yet have a point. Is Durkheim’s effervescence, mediated through layers of logocentricity and secularisation, perhaps ultimately a generalised expression for the joyful Hasidic rapture with which the Chosen dance around, and with, their Rebbe? (cf. Potok 1967).

With our above mention of the concept of logocentricity we have already hit upon what is perhaps the most important aspect of Durkheim’s Jewish identity. He came from a tradition where textuality / textual study (lernen, as the Yiddish expression is) had for two millennia constituted the principal means of Jewish ethnic diasporic survival, and where textual contemplation in itself is considered to have socially elevating and spiritually redeeming qualities. Against such a background, we can expect even a brilliant social analyst as Durkheim undoubtedly was, to lose sight of the overwhelmingly non-textual aspects of social and religious life, and genuinely believe that he may capture the essence of people on the other side of the globe, without sharing their life, without knowing their language of living their culture, in other words without engaging in prolonged professional fieldwork – but merely on the basis of an (ethnographic) text.

3. Durkheim and philosophy

3.1. Introduction

Until fairly recently (Early Modern times, as far as the North Atlantic, increasingly globalised, intellectual tradition is concerned), most of the branches of science and scholarship now distinguished in academia, all resorted under the heading of philosophy. Sociology and the other social sciences also went through an incubation time of a few centuries at least, when their subject matter was classified as philosophy – in fact, one of the first sociologists, Ibn Ḥaldun, writing in Tunis in the 14th c. CE, was primarily a historian, whereas the first truly modern philosopher, Immanuel Kant, taught anthropology and most of the natural sciences as a matter of course. At least two of the Founding Fathers of sociology, Durkheim and Marx, started out as philosophers. Durkheim’s fascination for the essence of society and religion was in the first place an (empirically grounded) philosophical fascination. In this light Durkheim’s explorations in the fields of epistemology and pre-modern (‘primitive’) forms of classification straddled the time-honoured stately garden of philosophy, and the small cabbage-patch which was only beginning to be cleared for the social sciences. Probably Durkheim’s greatest achievement was to articulate the social as an ontological level not to be entirely reduced to individual consciousness and motivation, and to be approached by a methodology, a conceptual apparatus, and a theory of its own.22

A refreshingly original perspective on Durkheim, stressing the latter's Jewish roots, is developed by Donald Nielsen (1999): presenting Durkheim not so much as a scientific sociologist but as a philosophical monist whose thought comes strikingly close to that of another renegade Jew, Baruch de Spinoza, whom we have already encountered above.

'The book provides a comprehensive examination of Durkheim's major and minor writings, especially his theory of religion and the categories, and compares his work with Aristotle, Bacon, Kant, and Renouvier. The author places Durkheim's thought in the context of an encounter between traditional religious ideals, especially Judaism, and modernizing scientific and philosophical currents.' (Nielsen o.c., author's summary)

3.2. Durkheim and Kant

As a product of the French educational system Durkheim’s ‘default’ frame of reference in philosophy would in the first place be Descartes’s radical rationalism, yet (due to Durkheim’s few years of academic studies in Germany, and also to the influence of his contemporary, the neo-Kantian Renouvier) it fact Kant is the greatest philosophical influence on Durkheim.

In terms of their significance in the History of Ideas, there is a striking similarity between Kant and Durkheim to be considered. In a way, Durkheim did for the social sciences what a century earlier Kant did for modern philosophy: establish the fundamental points of departure, on which there is no longer any going back – for Kant the critical realisation that all knowledge is essentially representation and therefore distortive and partial; for Durkheim the realisation that the social represents a level of existence in its own right, not to be reduced to the individual. The two positions are similar, which allows Gell (1998) to embrace in one argument both Durkheim, and what he considers neo-Kantian classic American anthropology of the mid-20th century. However, in another respect the two positions are fundamentally different, as we shall shortly see, and it is anachronistic to present them as equal and interchangeable, especially since Kant, implicitly and indirectly yet demonstrably, exercised a considerable influence on Durkheim. What is more, Hirst (1975) brought to light major epistemological shortcomings in Durkheim when tracing the latter’s links back to Kant.

The Kantian connection may also be looked at from a different angle. Campany fol-

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24 Durkheim wrote an introduction to: Hamelin, Octave, 1921, *Le Système de Descartes*, ed. L. Robin, Paris: Alcan; Hamelin is among the French philosophers claimed to have exerted considerable influence on Durkheim.


lows Godlove in a Kantian framework-model perspective on Durkheim (albeit through what is claimed to be a misreading) and further on to the recent philosopher Davidson. But when Godlove thus stresses the extent to which religion offers a framework to interpret the world,\textsuperscript{28} we should be heedful of Durkheim’s admonition:

‘La religion, en effet, n’est pas seulement un système d’idées, c’est avant tout un système de forces. L’homme qui vit religieusement, n’est pas seulement un homme qui se représente le monde de telle ou telle manière, qui sait ce que d’autres ignorent; c’est avant tout un homme qui sent en lui un pouvoir qu’il ne se connaît pas d’ordinaire, qu’il ne sent pas en lui quand il n’est pas à l’état religieux. La vie religieuse implique l’existence de forces très particulières. Je ne puis songer à les décrire ici; rappelant un mot connu,\textsuperscript{29} je me contenterai d’en dire que ce sont ces forces qui soulèvent les montagnes. J’entends par là que, quand l’homme vit de la vie religieuse, il croit participer à une force qui le domine, mais qui, en même temps, le soutient et l’élève au-dessus de lui-meme. Appuyé sur elle, il lui semble qu’il peut mieux faire face aux épreuves et aux difficultés de l’existence, qu’il peut même plier la nature à ses desseins.’ (Durkheim 1969 / 1914; my italics – WvB)

Kant and Durkheim – that would in the first place indicate a certain epistemology. ‘Overlooked, misunderstood and underestimated’ – this is Anne Rawls’s (1996)\textsuperscript{30} assessment of Durkheim’s epistemology. The same message dominates her splendid (2004) book-length study\textsuperscript{31} of Les Formes, a book which, in her opinion:\textsuperscript{32}

‘...has been consistently misunderstood. Rather than a work on primitive religion or the sociology of knowledge, Rawls asserts that Durkheim’s analysis represents an attempt to establish a unique epistemological basis for the study of sociology and moral relations’.

She elucidates (2004, o.c.: Chapter 2) Durkheim’s dualism as both ‘Anti-Kant and Anti-Rationalist’, and dwells on Durkheim’s notions of the ‘double man’ and of ‘two layers of knowledge’.

\textsuperscript{28} In African Studies this kind of perspective has been vocally articulated by Horton in his arguments on conversion, triggering a protracted debate: Horton, R., 1971, ‘African conversion’, Africa, 41: 85-108.

\textsuperscript{29} It appears as if the non-Christian Durkheim, deliberately or unawares, here attributes to a common expression, and appropriates, what is in fact a literal quotation from the Christian New Testament: St Paul’s 1 Corinthians, 13:2. Durkheim the agnostic, atheist, or renegade Jew, gives way here to the (meta-)sociologist who believes to have discovered that religion is really the backbone of all social life, and hence worthy of our greatest respect. Incidentally, Durkheim’s characterisation of religion as lifting the believer (like one in love?) above herself or himself, reminds us of Plato’s evocation of ‘transcendence’ as the movement which, starting from immanence, lifts the soul upward then let it return to earthly immanence again (Plato, Phaedrus, 246a f., Symposium, 209e f.; Plato, 1975, Plato in twelve volumes, I-XII, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge MA Harvard University Press / London: Heinemann; Duintjer, Otto Dirk, 2002, Onuitputtelijk is de waarheid, Budel: Damon; van Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2012c, Spiritualiteit, heelmaking en transcendentie, Haarlem: Shikanda, ; also at: http://www.quest-journal.net/PIP/spiritualiteit.pdf.


\textsuperscript{31} Rawls, Anne Warfield, 2004, Epistemology and Practice, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.

There is a considerable risk of misunderstanding on this point. Dualism\textsuperscript{33} may refer to any conceptualisation revolving on a fundamental distinction, from the relation between Lower and Upper Egypt, to body-mind dualism (Plato, St Augustine, Descartes), the Zoroastrian and Manichaean cosmology in which good and evil are considered to be complementary, or a political system that is \textit{de facto} composed of two major political parties, like for decades in the USA and the UK, etc. Anyway, the meaning that applies here is clearly defined:

‘Durkheim felt so strongly about the centrality of his position on dualism to the argument of \textit{The Elementary Forms} as a whole, and was so disappointed that the argument was misunderstood, that, in response to criticism of that book, he wrote an article devoted entirely to an explanation of his position on dualism. The article, “The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions” was published in 1914, in the Italian scholarly journal \textit{Scientia} two years after the publication of \textit{Les Formes}. In the \textit{Scientia} article Durkheim argued that there are two aspects of each human being: a pre-rational animal being and a rational social, or human, being. These two aspects of the person conflict with one another, producing the internal tension that philosophers across the ages have referred to as dualism.’ (Rawls 2004 o.c.: 72)

The \textit{Scientia} article was recently separately reprinted.\textsuperscript{34} Incidentally, Durkheim’s central association of evil with the individual, and of good with society could well serve as an illustration of the Jewish undercurrent in Durkheim’s thought: \textit{e.g.} Maimonides in the \textit{Guide for the Perplexed} (2012 / 1190)\textsuperscript{35} expounds the same view. Are we justified to draw up the equation that for Durkheim

\begin{equation*}
\text{social} : \text{sacred} = \text{individual} : \text{profane}........?
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Taking the reader by the hand, Rawls shows rather convincingly that \textit{Les Formes} is, indeed, not in the first place a study of primitive religion or of the sociology of knowledge, but a highly original epistemology and ontology disguised as ethnography but waiting to be decoded by readers who (like herself) are both philosophically and sociologically specialised. Thus she explains (Rawls 2004: 2n) how Durkheim’s treatment of categories (which in the light of both Aristotle and Kant is surprisingly selective, and notably leaves out \textit{classification} as an \textit{a priori} category in its own right) can only be understood and appreciated by the trained philosopher. It is the perennial bane of the social sciences: once having hived off from their intellectual and institutional original basis (\textit{i.e.} philosophy and the humanities in general) around 1900 CE, social scientists (and particularly anthropologists) have insisted on ‘going it alone’, and have haphazardly, and usually implicitly, applied their gaudy and fragmentary package of naïve common sense to immense problems of individual and social human existence – hilariously unheedful of the work of many centuries done on these crucial topics by philosophers.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[Maimonides, M., 2002, \textit{The guide of the perplexed}, Skokie II.: Varda, written c. 1190 CE.
  \item[van Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2003a, \textit{Intercultural encounters}, Berlin / Hamburg / London: LIT; also at: http://www.quest-]}
\end{itemize}
Even more amusingly, virtually all of Rawls' innovative finds and claims are dismissed by another Durkheim scholar of uncontested stature, Walter Schmaus (1998). Regrettably, in the present, limited scope I am unable to attempt a Judgment of Paris or a Solomon’s Judgment between these two positions.

Nor is Rawls vs. Schmaus the only exchange devoted to categories in Durkheim. Nielsen, who explicitly addresses Durkheim in the first place as a philosopher rather than as a theoretical sociologist, writes insightfully on Durkheim’s category of totality as an overarching concept in which God, society and religion all seem to come together in the individual experience.

3.3. Durkheim’s sociology of knowledge

In an impressive study, Paul Q. Hirst (1975; cf. Chazel 1976) examined in detail the epistemology underlying Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, and pronounces it to be simply impossible, implicitly based as it is on the Kantian division between natural sciences and cultural sciences, yet seeking a science of man predicated on the non-subjectivist natural-science model which, nonetheless, is to be non-positivist... A few years before the publication of Les Formes, Durkheim presented an argument specifically on epistemology. For this aspect of Durkheim’s work, Anne Rawls (o.c.) can hardly find superlatives enough:

‘Durkheim’s epistemology, the argument for the social origins of the categories of the understanding, is his most important and most neglected argument. This argument has been confused with his sociology of knowledge, and Durkheim’s overall position has been misunderstood as a consequence. The current popularity of a “cultural” or “ideological” interpretation of Durkheim is as much a misunderstanding of his position as the “functional” interpretation from which the current interpretations seek to rescue him. Durkheim articulated a sophisticated epistemology in the classical sense, a point that has been entirely missed’. (Rawls o.c.)

Durkheim was not the only one of the Founding Fathers of the social sciences to initiate a sociology of knowledge, and to argue the social origin of our categories of thought. Although ignored by Durkheim, Marx’s epistemology has been better known and, given its emp-
beddedness in a materialist view of history as revolving on class struggle, more transparent and less steeped in societal mysticism despite the perspective of the classless society at the end of history. The Durkheimian/Maussian adage to the effect that the **classification of things reproduces the classification of humans** lies at the root of Lévi-Strauss’s reviving the study of Totemism, and *La Pensée Sauvage*, in the 1960s – reinforcing an influential school of Structuralist Anthropology, notably in France, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

In a thoughtful overview Bloor (1982) concedes the value of this perspective, but also reminds us of Gehlke’s and Dennes’s criticism to the effect that by a Kantian conception of mind (as ‘the subject’s system of cognitive faculties’; Kant 1983a / 1781), Durkheim’s approach on this point is allegedly ‘ambiguous, even nonsensical’. The same topic comes back, succinctly, in Alexander’s (1982) consideration of social logic in the light of Marx and Durkheim; in Susan Stedman Jones’s (2012) reconsideration of categories in *Les Formes*, and in Tony Edward’s (2002) contribution to the volume on Durkheim’s religion theory edited by Idinopoulos and Wilson (2002). Anne Warfield Rawls (1996, 2004) has not been the only one to claim that Durkheim’s theory of the social background of thought was in fact, his principal and lasting contribution to sociology and philosophy. Also LaCapra devotes important pages to Durkheim’s

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50 *Reappraising Durkheim*, o.c.


epistemology, which he considers ‘a corollary of his social metaphysic’. Moreover, it is his approach to rules, classifications, and causes which made Durkheim one of the great inspirers of a movement prominent in the late 20th c. CE among sociologists and meanwhile subsided: *ethnomethodology*.  

3.4. On primitive classification

Tracing in detail the Kantian and neo-Kantian echoes in Durkheim would be rewarding and revealing, but it would require a specialist philosophical study in its own right. However, let me mention one point that has fascinated me ever since my first encounter with Durkheim’s work, in 1965. For Durkheim (and Mauss, with whom he pioneered this breakthrough notion) the fundamental categories of our thought: time, place, causation, number, logical operations, etc.) are not innate in the human individual, but are a product of social life – they emerge from the structuring of reality that is brought about by ‘the elementary form of the religious life’. For an intellectual whose founding of the sociological discipline did not leave him the time (contrary to Max Weber) to make, at the same time, major contributions to historiography, this position on humankind’s fundamental categories is absolutely seminal – even although it admittedly echoed, and rephrased, earlier similar pronouncements made by Marx. If our fundamental categories derive from society, then instead of being innate, universal, and immutable, they may vary from place to place, from period to period, and from culture to culture. They are inevitably subject to a cultural history, whose outlines and remotest periods we may not be able to capture, but whose implications we can at least attempt to think through.

The anonymous reviewer (‘B.’) of Needham’s (1963) English edition of *Primitive classification* for *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1963), and using Needham’s own words, calls our attention to a remarkable oversight:

> ‘it is an odd and perturbing fact that [Durkheim & Mauss’s work on primitive classification – WvB] is virtually unknown to the majority of professional anthropologists . . . and even the distinguished gathering of linguists, anthropologists, psychologists and philosophers who met in 1953 to discuss Whorf’s hypotheses about the relationship of linguistic categories to conceptions of the world no-

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Archaeology, historical linguistics and molecular genetics are the three sciences that, in the course of the last few decades, have made tremendous progress in reconstructing humankind’s remotest past with ever greater confidence and methodological credibility, and of late they have been joined by Comparative Mythology. We may postulate that the emergence of Anatomically Modern Humans, in Africa c. 200,000 years ago (200 ka BP), or their subsequent spread to other continents, from c. 80 ka BP, already concerns a form of humanity in the full (albeit perhaps still implied, and unfolding) possession of such fundamental categories as characterise and sustain our human existences today. The existence of hundreds of (near-) universals of culture suggests that the Out-of-Africa Exodus of Anatomically Modern Humans spread across the globe an initial cultural package that had been incubated on the African continent for more than 100 ka and that contained most or all of our modern fundamental categories. But what went before? How did these categories come into being? No doubt as a result of the gradual differentiation and transformation of productive, reproductive, social, communicative and mental faculties based on emergent social life in very small largely kin-based groups, since the Lower Palaeolithic.

This is a social, and implicitly an historical, answer to the question of origin and growth.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’, in: idem, ed., Language and culture, University of Chicago Press, pp. 92-105; Black, M., 1959, ‘Linguistic relativity’, Philosophical Review, 68: 228-238; Sapir, E., 1929/1949, Selected writings in language, culture and personality, ed. Mandelbaum, D.G., Berkeley: University of California Press; Sapir, E. 1921. Language, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. I doubt whether the reviewer’s indignation is not simply anachronistic. The compartmentalisation between national fields of science production bounded by national languages used to be a fact until in the second half of the 20th c. CE English eclipsed all rival languages (e.g. German, French and Latin) as vehicles of international scientific communication. Moreover, when the French School of social science half a century after Durkheim spawned anthropological structuralism, this was initially so fiercely contested as to be ignored by an international crowd contemplating the claims of such American linguists as Whorf and Sapir.


59 ka = kiloyears, i.e. 1000 years; BP = Before Present.

inevitably raised by Kant’s revolutionary position, when he claimed that these same fundamental categories were not in themselves knowledge and the fruits of knowledge formation, but categories a priori, for which he therefore claimed the irreducible and often misunderstood status of being ‘transcendental’. It is here where Kant and Durkheim converge, and where the latter begins to quicken Kant’s essentially static, eternal and origin-less transcendental categories with the pulse of the earliest social life, and of remotest history – with, in other words, the elementary forms of the religious life. In a way, after Kant’s Copernican Revolution in philosophy, Durkheim’s insistence on the social nature of the transcendental categories went one further step comparable, in importance, to the Theory of Relativity. Little wonder that Rawls sees here Durkheim’s greatest intellectual contribution.

### 3.5. Durkheim’s puzzling realism in his approach to religion

Karen Fields not only produced an excellent new translation of Les Formes to replace Swain’s of 1915, but also enriched the international Durkheim literature with a series of penetrating studies on the topic. Significantly, she opened the long introduction to her translation with a reminder to the effect that for Durkheim, religion is not an illusion, but is founded upon and expresses ‘the real’ – notably, the reality that in religion, society becomes conscious of itself and becomes the object of religious veneration.

Realisme in the Durkheimian context does not have the usual, non-specialist meaning ‘the resigned common-sense attitude of accepting things as they are’, but specifically indicates the epistemological position according to which we truly have the capability of knowing reality as it really is – either as projections of concrete models out there (Plato), or as the concrete embodiment of such models (Aristotle). Since Kant, Western philosophy has largely abandoned these complementary conceptions of reality, for one of radical idealism, and according to which we can only know the images of things we have formed in our mind. Again we must expose Durkheim as ultimately un-Kantian. In the words of my Rotterdam colleague Henk Oosterling, since Kant we have been ‘Moved by

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62 It is the leading thought of Kant’s critical philosophical writings that we humans cannot know the world as it is, but can only know the (inevitably distorted) representation of the world which we form in our minds. This central idea brought about the ‘Copernican Revolution’ in Western philosophy – two and a half centuries after Copernicus, with his heliocentrism, did something similar for astronomy; cf. Copernicus, N., 1539, Nicolai Copernici Torinensis De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, libri VI, Norimbergae: Petrejus; Schiaparelli, G.V., 1876, Die Vorläufer des Copernicus im Alterthum, Leipzig: Quandt & Händel; Kuhn, T.S., 1957, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.


65 ibidem.
Appearances’. However, I think (cf. my Sangoma Science, o.c.) it would be more correct, and do greater justice to both the fact and the incredible powers of religion, to incorporate the Kantian position, as only one limiting condition, in a more comprehensive ontology according to which we continuously oscillate (albeit in ways we hardly understand and cannot yet control, but which yet is the essence of being in this world) between (a) mere appearances with all the implied ignorance (Kant), and (b) true reality with all the implied true and essential knowledge, with all the power that entails. In such an ontology, the Aristotelian logical mainstay of classic scientific thought (‘where P, there not not-P’) would again be relegated to a boundary condition, and religion would occasionally appear as a social / symbolic technology to tap the unlimited resources of the universe.

Robert Alun Jones, another important writer on Durkheimian matters, in his contribution to Relire Durkheim (a 1990, French-language collection from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France), believes he can lay bare the roots of this surprising ‘realism’ on the part of Durkheim:

’L’Evolution pédagogique en France éclaire des aspects peu connus de la pensée Durkheim, tels que son anti-cléricalisme ou son engagement en faveur de l’école laïque. On sait que Durkheim considérait l’Eglise médiévale comme le dépositaire de certaines vérités fondamentales: la nécessité de former << l’homme total >>, l’interpénétration de la foi et de la raison dans la philosophie scolastique, et, par dessus tout, l’idée chrétienne du devoir. A l’inverse, il s’en prit à la Renaissance et aux Lumières pour leur interprétation sociologiquement incohérente du Moyen Âge, pour leur intérêt excessif porté au goût, à l’élégance et au style, pour leur adoption des valeurs païennes, à l’origine de la corruption du sens du devoir hérité du christianisme, enfin, pour leur << mentalité mathématique >> qui aboutit à un goût trop simplificateur pour les généralisations et l’abstraction. En fait, les mérites que Durkheim reconnaît au réalisme pédagogique de Comenius, Leibniz, W[u]ndt et, de façon plus générale, au protestantisme allemand, opposé au << formalisme >> du Moyen-Âge et de la Renaissance, constituent le contexte à partir duquel il énonça sa célèbre injonction: considérer les faits sociaux comme des choses. C’est de partir de là aussi qu’il en appela à un << nouveau rationalisme >>, plus inductif, complexe, historique, et par-dessus tout plus attentif à l’importance première des choses que ne l’était le rationalisme dépassé d’un Descartes.’

One can understand and corroborate Jones’s nutshell summary of European intellectual history, but frankly, contrary to his initial assertion, and brainwashed as I have been for half a century by the emic / etic distinction which dominates modern anthropology, I fail to see how this compels us ‘to consider social facts as things’, an imperative already stated in Les Règles. This, in fact, is what Garfinkel, the founder of the sociological movement known as ‘ethnomethodology’, considers to be ‘Durkheim’s

69 Durkheim, Émile, 1897a, Les règles de la méthode sociologique, Paris: Alcan; first ed. 1895.
aphorism’ – upon which, Garfinkel asserts, ethnomethodology’s entire programme is based. It is a position that (as we have already seen) was endorsed by one of the brightest minds in current Durkheim studies, the philosopher / sociologist Anne Warfield Rawls, who edited and introduced Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological Program, and in several publications,71 maintained that it is not Durkheim’s theory of religion or society, but his thesis of the social production of (what since Kant would be called) a priori categories, which constitutes Durkheim’s main claim to fame (had it not been that Marx made a similar point half a century earlier).

In relation to the conceptualisation of space Terry Godlove72 takes up related issues and traces Durkheim’s indebtedness to Kant through the nineteenth-century French neo-Kantians Renouvier and Hamelin, and moreover asserts the complementarity rather than mutual exclusiveness of Kant and Durkheim. But other authors have been dismissive of Durkheim’s epistemology from the beginning, and this may explain how Rawls could perceive a general lack of appreciation of Durkheim’s merits on this point.

When insightfully discussing Durkheim’s implicit emergentism, Sawyer (2002)73 takes the opportunity of pointing out how precisely the above ‘aphorism’ has earned Durkheim the most severe criticism from the part of modern sociologists as Giddens, Luke and Alexander.74 Already much earlier Goldenweiser, a vocal American anthropological author on totemism at the time of the publication of Les Formes, phrased his misgivings in the following terms:

‘The author’s attempt to derive all mental categories from specific phases of social life which have become conceptualized, is so obviously artificial and one-sided that one finds it hard to take his view seriously, but the self-consistency of the argument and, in part, its brilliancy compel one to do so. In criticism we must repeat (...): in so far as Durkheim’s socially determined categories presuppose a complex and definite social system, his explanatory attempts will fail, wherever such a system is not available. The Eskimo, for example, have no clans nor phratries nor a totemic cosmogony (for they have no totems);75 how then did their mental categories originate, or is the concept of classification foreign to the Eskimo mind? Obviously, there must be other sources in experience or the psychological constitution of man which may engender mental categories; and, if that is so, we may no longer derive such categories from the social setting, even when the necessary complexity and definiteness are at hand. In this connection it is well to remember that the origin of mental categories is an eternally recurring event; categories come into being within the mental world of every single individual. We may thus observe that the categories of space, time, force, causality, arise in the mind of the child far ahead of any possible

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75 For empirical evidence to the contrary, see van Binsbergen, Confronting, o.c: 64n f.
influence from their adult surroundings by way of conscious or even deliberate suggestion. To be sure, these categories are, in the mind of the child, not strictly conceptualized nor even fully within the light of consciousness, but their presence is only too apparent: the individual experience of the child rapidly supplements the congenital predisposition of the mind.'

Goldenweiser here takes an advance on the future outcome of one of the most complex research programmes in developmental psychology. Half a century later, and clearly with Kant’s list of *a priori* categories in mind, Piaget gained world fame with a long series of studies on this point. Their innateness (as suggested by Goldenweiser) is again a moot point, – championed by great minds such as Chomsky or Jung, but also contested by many anthropologists, who prefer to restrict the acquisition of culture to a sensorily-supported social communication process. Even so, it looks as if Goldenweiser, when stressing such learning processes in the child, is missing Durkheim’s point. The latter’s claims as to the social origin of the categories was not just about intergenerational transmission, in other words about the way they are learned by every specific child, but about their very genesis. Without society they would not exist – as if Durkheim was in fact speaking of *culture*, a concept scarcely elaborated yet, in his time, to become the pivotal; theoretical concept it was to constitute later in the 20th c. CE. Remains the problem of *emergence* – what then produced society in the first place, for it to be able to generate the categories?

*What looms behind this entire problematic is the question of *emergence*: if we need a society in order to be venerated in religion, and in order to produce categories of thought and classification, what then produces society in the first place, and how is the threshold of emergence crossed which leads from incipient, inchoate social relations to the kind of enduring structure that might be able to produce the many effects and characteristics Durkheim attributes to society?* To this crucial question, few Durkheim commentators have given any thought. Filloux (1990) speaks of a reconciliation of individualism and socialism and of ‘the emergence of a society founded on the religion of the individual’, but from a Durkheimian perspective the latter would be merely begging the question. Far more to the point is Sawyer when he points out:

‘The concept of emergence is a central thread uniting Durkheim’s theoretical and empirical work, yet this aspect of Durkheim’s work has been neglected,’

and continues to discuss the links between Durkheim’s implicit emergentism, and theories of emergence developed by contemporary philosophers of mind:

‘In recent decades, emergence has been extensively discussed by philosophers of mind, psychological theorists, and cognitive scientists because these fields are increasingly threatened by the potential of re-

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78 Sawyer, ‘Dilemma’, o.c.
duction to neuroscience. The threat – analogous to the threats of methodological individualism facing sociology – is that these disciplines will be reduced to explanations and analyses of neurons and their interactions. These conceptions of emergence have been inspired by computational models of emergence processes, including connectionism (Clark 1997), artificial life (Brooks & Maes 1994; Langton 1994), and multi-agent models of social systems (Gilbert & Conte 1995; Prietula et al. 1998). In this recent formulation, emerging systems are complex dynamical systems that display global behavior that cannot be predicted from a full and complete description of the component units of the system.’ (Sawyer o.c.)

Durkheim implicitly breaks with Kant in insisting upon the social reality that he alleges to lie behind the symbols, and on the knowability of that reality, instead of resigning himself, with Kant, to the mere images we have in our human minds. What Durkheim gains is: thus he begins to be capable to explain the scope and force of religion; what he loses is all anchorage in the single most constructive insight in modern philosophy (Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’). In the process Durkheim particularly forfeits: a credible answer to those who, on quite substantial grounds, remind us that, after all, the beings venerated in religious ritual do not exist, in other words, are not in any way real to begin with (although they may be virtual in the sense of having real effects).

Impossible though Hirst declares Durkheim’s epistemology to be, it yet captures successfully one side of the religious medal:

- the capability of generating realities.

It fails, however, to capture the other side, and the mechanism behind it:

- the constant oscillation (which I believe is nothing less than the ontological essence of reality) between the real and the unreal, between
  (a) symbols that refer to their referents and
  (b) symbols that no longer do so and that, situationally, take on a life of their own.

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81 I have returned to this problematic, succinctly in Chapter 10 of Confronting (o.c.), and extensively in my most recent book van Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2021, Sangoma Science, Hoofddorp: Shikanda, PIP / TraCS also at: http://www.quest-journal.net/shikanda/topicalities/Sangoma_Science_version_Juli_2021.pdf
As I argue in detail in my recent book *Sangoma Science*,

\[\text{In religion we have proceeded beyond the limits of applicability of standard, Aristotelian, binary logic, the one governed by the adage}
\]

\[\text{‘If P, then not (not P)’}.\]

Although exposed to the Kantian and Hegelian tradition, Durkheim remained too much of a rationalistic Cartesian (albeit, in the words of Jones (1994, o.c.), an ‘amibivalent’ one),\(^83\) to dare admit that in this oscillation, more than in any of the institutions and concepts he studied in such detail in *Les Formes*, lies the true ‘elementary form of religious life’.

3.6. Durkheim the moralist

The common insistence on Durkheim’s theoretical-sociological side, and his almost total appropriation by academic sociology (at the expense of philosophy) in the course of the 20th c. CE, cannot capture the thrust of his thought in its entirety. He wrote not from a detached scientific interest but as a deeply concerned member of West European society around 1900 – a time which he perceived to be one of anomie, and of secularisation (of which Durkheim himself was a personal example), even though admittedly his attention was not focused on social inequality, class conflict, the colonial subjugation of large parts of the globe, nor – except towards the end of his life, when the issue of peace entered into his writing – on the mounting international tensions leading on to World War I (in which not only many of his students but also his own son was to be killed, an event which also sent the father to an early grave, aged 59). The way Durkheim writes about religion is puzzling: he is not preaching any particular creed, is himself a non-believer in any form of organised religion or any deity, yet he passionately impersonates the believer and the strength the latter derives from religion, and (as Durkheim thought) via religion, *from society*. This lends to much of his writing a moral dimension which we cannot sweep under the carpet simply because the present-day academic sociologist no longer sees herself or himself as a moralist, a prophet and a healer. Isambert (1990) is one of the commentators to pick up this vital dimension of Durkheim’s work; Stephen Turner (1993; *cf.* Lehmann 1996)\(^84\) devoted an entire book to this issue.

The moral aspects of Durkheim’s view of society and religion have been clearly dis-

\(^{82}\) *Sangoma Science*, o.c.


cussed by Bellah (1973, reprinted 1990 in French translation). Confronted with the serious allegation of having misrepresented Durkheim, Talcott Parsons (for decades one of the leading American sociologists, and Durkheim’s most influential commentator) adduces Bellah as sharing his opinion, and responds to his own critics Pope and Cohen, making only a slight correction to his earlier rendering of Durkheim:

‘At this point I wish to modify the position I took in The Structure of Social Action (1937). In dealing with the concept of constraint, I said that Durkheim set forth three principal concepts – constraint by the facts of the environment, constraint by sanctions used in enforcing norms, and constraint by voluntary consent to the binding character of internalized norms, i.e., by moral authority. My change of view has been that, though the last concept came to be central in Durkheim’s later work, he by no means abandoned the others, particularly the first. Durkheim’s view of the social environment can be interpreted, as I was not aware at the time of writing The Structure of Social Action (1937), as the internal environment of the action system, in a sense parallel to Claude Bernard’s concept (…) of the internal environment of a complex organism. In my view Durkheim never abandoned this conception of social facts, and it was correct for him to maintain the position he did.’

3.7. Durkheim and other philosophers

In addition to the philosophical strands from Descartes and Kant as highlighted above, many commentators have stressed how Durkheim build on Comte’s positive philosophy as a religion of humanity, but in fact Durkheim, while greatly respecting Comte as a proto-sociologist, seldom engaged in debate with Comte’s work. Much attention has been paid, over the decades, to Durkheim’s relationship with Pragmatism. There have been several studies elaborating this point. Here an obvious role should

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88 Structure, o.c.
have been played by Cuvillier’s\textsuperscript{94} reconstruction of Durkheim’s own 1913-1914 lecture course on ‘Pragmatisme et Sociologie’, at the Sorbonne, Paris. However, we have already heard Anne Rawls’s\textsuperscript{95} complaint in regard of Durkheim’s epistemology: overlooked, misunderstood and underestimated.

If Durkheim does not personally and explicitly engage in debate\textsuperscript{96} with Marx despite their converging view on selected points (notably the social origin of the categories), some Marxists and Durkheimian have done just that.\textsuperscript{97} Challenger\textsuperscript{98}, writing when Marxism had already gone out of fashion once more in the international social sciences,\textsuperscript{99} made the remarkable point that the real challenge for social theoreticians is to formulate an alternative to the Marxist paradigm. Subsequently, Challenger sets out to demonstrate that, viewed\textsuperscript{100} ‘through the lens of Aristotle’, Durkheim does precisely that. However, as one


\textsuperscript{96} However, see Durkheim’s review of Labriola’s Marxist exposé: Durkheim, Émile, 1897b, \textit{Review of Labriola, Essai sur le Conception Materialiste de l'Histoire\textsuperscript{1}}, \textit{Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger}, 44: 645-651; Durkheim also wrote a book on socialism, whose 1962 English translation was edited by the prominent American sociologist A. Gouldner, while the original French introduction was by Mauss: Durkheim, É., 1896, \textit{Le socialisme}, Paris: Alcan.


\textsuperscript{100} The metaphor is amusingly anachronistic: spectacles only came into use in the high Middle Ages, 1500 years after Aristotle; centuries after Aristotle, the Emperor Nero, in the first c. CE, was reputed to peep through a beryl, i.e. Be₃Al₃(SiO₃)₆ crystal, and this provided the etymon for Brille / bril, ‘spectacles’, in German, Dutch etc. As I have extensively argued from an African and intercultural-philosophical perspective, it often turns out to be condescending and implicitly hegemonic to try and view the modern world ‘through the lens of Aristotle’ – which e.g. specialists in rhetoric as a branch of philosophy have tried to do for South Africa’s transformation towards majority rule in the 1990s (Salazar, P.-J., Osha, S., & van Binsbergen, Wim M.J., 2002, eds, \textit{Truth in Politics, Rhetorical Approaches to Democratic Deliberation in Africa and beyond}, special issue of \textit{Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy}, 16, 1-2; also at: \url{http://www.quest-journal.net/2002.htm}; \textit{van Binsbergen, Wim M.J.,} 2004c, ‘Postscript: Aristotle in Africa, \textit{ibidem}: 238-272, also at:}.
reviewer McCance\textsuperscript{101} cannot fail to point out, Challenger's subsequent treatment of major postmodern philosophers\textsuperscript{102} leaves too much to be desired to buy his surprising Aristotelian solution lock, stock and barrel.

Durkheim was not the only French philosopher with a passion for the ethnographic literature and for problems of intercultural comparison and cultural origins. Anthropologists were early alerted to the work of Durkheim's colleague Lucien Lévy-Bruhl through the initially enthusiastic reviews of his work from the hand of E.E. Evans-Pritchard, a colonial anthropologist stationed in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Evans-Pritchard would soon, through his writings on the Nuer, the Shilluk, and the Azande, with special emphasis on their religion, magic, divination and kingship, become one of the most prominent British anthropologists. One of Lévy-Bruhl's principal works\textsuperscript{103} was published in the context of Durkheim's seminal journal \textit{L'Année Sociologique}, the backbone of the latter's sociological school. Durkheim used one and the same article\textsuperscript{104} to present a summary of both Lévy-Bruhl's book and of his own \textit{Les Formes}, stressing the continuity between the two approaches. The closeness between Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl may surprise social scientists today. For in today's discourse Lévy-Bruhl (with such book titles as \textit{Les Fonctions Mentales Dans Les Sociétés Inférieures / How Natives Think} and \textit{La Mentalité Primitive / Primitive Mentality}\textsuperscript{105} became emblematic for a particular, discarded, apparently racist construction of the colonial subject as inferior to the West European colonisers.\textsuperscript{106} By contrast, Durkheim, although likewise inviting our criticism because of his systematic shunning issues of social inequality, exploitation, class struggle and violence (hence dissimulating the very reasons why today we take our distance from the products of colonial science), yet largely managed to escape Lévy-Bruhl's stigmatisation. This was not in the first place because of the wider scope and relevance of Durkheim's thought, but particularly because the latter, from today's (inevitably anachronistic, for politically correct) perspective, \textit{made the right choice in taking – in Les Formes – Australian Aboriginals, classified as 'Blacks' and among the most wretched of marginalised peoples around 1900 CE, as exemplary of the whole of humankind and its religion.}


\textsuperscript{102} Who, obviously, would be much more likely candidates than Aristotle for offering a viable sociological interpretation of our present, postmodern world; cf. 'Postscript', o.c.


\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Les Fonctions, o.c.}

\textsuperscript{106} The present limited scope cannot accommodate the question, very hot in the 1960s-1980s, as to the extent to which pre-1960 anthropology may be considered the handmaiden of colonialism; cf. Confronting, o.c.: 70n, with references.
3.8. From philosophy to sociology

Ironically, Durkheim, against his philosophical background, succeeded in creating a viable sociology by detaching it from philosophy – leaving to subsequent generations the task of creating a viable intercultural philosophy, *i.e.* one cut to the measure of decolonisation, and globalisation (brought about by a whole range of factors and processes, including the capitalist mode of production, world religions, formal education, and modern science, global migration, the emerging global politics of knowledge, digitalised information and communication on a global scale, etc.) When I took over the Rotterdam Chair of Foundations of Intercultural Philosophy in 1998, well over a century after Durkheim had acceded to the first French chair in sociology, at the University of Bordeaux, France, 1887-1888, I came to realise⁹⁷ that on this philosophical side painfully little progress had been made in the meantime. The social sciences had effectively been established, and had reached their highest culmination around the middle of the 20th c. CE, but by the end of the 20th century, the position of *academia* within postmodern, post-democratic society had already become so weak and the increasingly volatile, uncontrollable forces of corporate capital in collusion with military and post-imperialist international ambitions, had largely deprived academic intellectual production of all hope at relevant, responsible and independent societal impact.

And what is more, within academia the self-assertive vocality of the social sciences in the 1960-1980s had given way to a guilty aloofness and reticence, as if convinced of their own irrelevance. One of the aspects of this process was that my new philosophical colleagues at Rotterdam – and, with them, Postmodernists throughout the present-day world at large – could afford, with impunity, to totally ignore, or ridicule, the empirical basis and methods of the variety of social-science-based intercultural philosophy I had come to represent in their midst. With considerable exaggeration one might say⁹⁸ that Postmodernism (including the Foucaultian and Deleuzian encroachments, attempts to reinvent the social sciences on a personal basis, without being answerable to empirical data and intersubjective method) had exploded the social sciences which Durkheim had created at the cost of excessively hard work and an early death.

Even so, the twentieth century had been the century of the social sciences. The latter had supplanted the individual-centred image of humanity that – I repeat – had dominated Western thought, art and *belles lettres* since Graeco-Roman Antiquity (perhaps with an interlude during Medieval collectivism under the aegis of the Christian Church). That the social had established itself as a category *sui generis*, meant the culminating success of Durkheim’s life’s project.

Such a triumph (although already wearing out towards the year 2000 CE) could not have been the work of just one man. Admittedly, Durkheim was not the only Founding Father

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of the social sciences – we must not overlook Marx, Simmel, Tönnies, Weber, Pareto, Troeltsch, etc. Moreover, Durkheim had shown the intuition of the true social scientist by realising that scientific truth is a collective product, and had constantly steered towards the institutionalisation of his insights in the form of an authoritative journal, *L’Année Sociologique*, and an institutional basis. In fact, the maturation and dissemination of Durkheim’s social thought was largely in the hands of his three closest students, Marcel Mauss, Robert Hertz (even though the latter was already killed in 1915 in World War I), and Henri Hubert. These were loyal but independent minds, whose contributions also consisted in correcting one-sidednesses in Durkheim’s own work. Hertz’s greatest merit has perhaps been to stress the negative aspects of the *sacred* which, in *Les Formes*, appears in exaggerated glory and splendour – an antidote which also renders Durkheim’s veneration of society somewhat more palatable and realistic, and less corporatistic, less potentially fascistoid. Further, Martelli\(^\text{109}\) highlights a disagreement between Durkheim and Mauss concerning the nature of the *sacred*. The differences, in certain respects fundamental, between Durkheim and his closest co-workers, have recently been articulated once more around the concepts of ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, with an application of Vietnamese commemoration of the war dead.\(^\text{110}\)

Outside France, Durkheim’s impact upon twentieth-century sociology has been rather more limited – especially outside the restricted field of the sociology of religion – than that of Max Weber, certainly after Gerth, Mills and Mannheim made Weber’s main books, originally written in German, available in English translations. Weber’s sociological methodology differed from Durkheim’s in stressing the subjective, interpretive, by implication individual-centred, complementary dimension of social life and of social research – against Durkheim’s radical sociologistic insistence on his claim ‘social facts are things’.\(^\text{111}\) If social facts were indeed things, they ought to be capable of existing without the necessary intervention of the human subject’s conscious mind, percep-
tions and motivations – the latter the very object of Weber’s *Verstehende sociology* – which was more in continuity with the individual-centered orientation of Western thought since Antiquity.\(^\text{112}\) Weber’s philosophical roots were not so much directly Kantian or Cartesian, but had primarily been pioneered by Wilhelm Dilthey in a bid to establish the Humanities on a more secure epistemological footing by the late 19th c. CE.


\(^{111}\) Les Règles, o.c.

Durkheim’s radical positioning elicited much criticism, already within a year.\textsuperscript{113} However, true to life, and fortunately for the 20th-c. CE development of the social sciences, Durkheim’s application of his own programmatic statements has not been without contradictions and inconsistencies. Thus, for instance, in \textit{Les Formes}, there is a considerable appeal to the conscious perceptions and motivations of the Australian carriers of the alleged ‘elementary forms of religious life’. We should therefore not be too surprised to see Durkheim yet listed even among the precursors of interpretative sociology.\textsuperscript{114}

\section*{4. Conclusion}

In this argument I have discussed some of the philosophical strands that informed Durkheim as an exponent of French thought, and enabled him to become one of a handful of Founding Fathers of the social sciences. We had occasion to highlight, more than in most current discussions of Durkheim, his Jewish background, and his firm rootedness in the central European philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant. We touched on his sociology of knowledge, his emphasis on classification, his puzzling realism in regard of religion, and his moralism. Steering away from his original field of academic philosophy so as to establish the new field of the social sciences, Durkheim did not work out these orientations into consistent philosophical discourse yet they have continued to inform French thought, and the social sciences internationally, to this very day.

Wim van Binsbergen (*1947) read third-world sociology, anthropology and linguistics at Amsterdam University. He taught theoretical sociology at the University of Zambia, prior to establishing himself as a leading Africanist and anthropologist of religion. In mid-career he acceded to the Chair of Foundations of Intercultural Philosophy, Rotterdam. He is the author of numerous articles and books in a range of disciplines from archaeology and linguistics to ethnography, comparative mythology, and philosophy. Most of his publications are freely accessible at: http://quest-journal.net/shikanda
